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1947

pp. 12064 to end

pp. 12064 to end

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References:-

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371 / 61893

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12064

1947

PALESTINE

19 EC

Registry
Number

E 12064/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir R. Campbell
(Cairo)

No.

2349

Dated

Received
in Registry

18 Dec.

19 Dec.

Arab attitude towards partition of Palestine.

Arab leaders finished their meeting on
Dec 17 & issued a communique condemning
the partition of Palestine & stating that Arab
States would unite to save Palestine.
Summarizes text of communique.

Last Paper.

E 12050.

References.

(Print.)

61893

(How disposed of.)

S. L. Harrison (C.O.)
Cdr. Evenden (C.O.)
17.1.3 a
M.O.4.
Q.M.
Adm. Dec. 19
(an 11996)

(Action
completed.)

PP 30/12
1/12

(Index.)

1/12
1/12

Next Paper.

E 12101

(Minutes.)

SA 24/12
U.N. Political Dept.
Egypt for
G.M.D. 2/12 (Int. recd.).

H.B. 20/12

SA P.P. C.R.O. 61 0.628 20/12
- - 0.988 25/12
- - 0.610 17/12

H.B. 1/11

SA P.P. BRO 61 0 14(5) 10/11

H.B. 13/11

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En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. I. Campbell D.9.37 p.m. 18th December, 1947.
No. 2349

18th December, 1947. R.10.23 p.m. 18th December, 1947.

Repeated to Amman,
Beirut
Bagdad
Damascus
Jedda
Jerusalem

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 2349 of 18th December,
repeated to Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem.

[Begins].

Arab leaders ended their meetings here yesterday and issued official communiqué condemning partition of Palestine and promising that Arab States would unite to save Palestine for Arabs. No details of plans were disclosed.

2. Communiqué blames the Mandatory Power for imposing a Foreign people on Palestine who have robbed Arabs of their land and means of existence and for allowing them to form a trained army which in recent years has become an instrument of terror. Arab delegates have repeatedly drawn attention of the Mandatory Power to consequences which are such as to cause wars and troubles between Moslems and Christians on one hand and Jews on other hand, which may even spread to whole East. At the General Assembly of United Nations Arab delegates pointed out rights of Arabs in Palestine but the Assembly ignored the principles of the Charter and placed half-a-million Arabs under the yoke of no greater number of Zionists and that after the Mandatory Power had taken Arabs' arms away. At their meeting, heads and representatives of Arab Governments decided that partition was fundamentally wrong. In accordance with will of their peoples they have decided to take radical measures which will cause iniquitous project of partition to fail. The world will see it is impossible to beat Arabs by force and that when Arabs insisted on principles of right and justice and put world on guard against consequences of Zionist adventure, they were only wanting right and justice for every one. Since passions and interests predominated even in United Nations and the gates of right and justice have been closed before them, Arabs are firmly resolved to enter the fight into which they have been drawn and will continue until final victory. Then the principles of United Nations will be stabilised and principles of justice and equality reign in the Holy Land.

3. Full translation follows by bag.

B B B

19 DEC

19 DEC 1947
10-11-47
10-11-47

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Relations. 17 DEC 1947

(BY AIR MAIL)

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

O.D.
INDEXED

12064 95-1 ?1

(Sent 13th Dec., 1947.)

D. No. 610 SAVING SECRET.

My telegram 7th. December D. No. 955:

PALESTINE.

We have now received reactions of Arab Governments to our withdrawal plans (my telegram under reference paragraph 7).

2.. In general, approval and thanks were expressed for our action in conveying advance information of our plans, but for most part it was pointed out that, although our attitude was neutral, our policy, as outlined, was bound to aid partition or at least would seem to Arabs to do so. Particular points were made as under.

3. Egypt. Minister of Foreign Affairs was concerned with question of arms which he said we had prevented Arabs from obtaining whereas Jews had found means of obtaining them and had well-trained forces. It appeared that Arabs were required to wait to be massacred.

4. Lebanon. (a) Prime Minister objected to there being an interval between relinquishment of Mandate and complete evacuation. He was disturbed that evacuation should be from South to North. He feared Commission might arrive at early date and shelter under wing of United Kingdom Forces, thereby creating interference in internal situation tantamount to "partition before partition", particularly if Commission was subjected to such Jewish pressure as to declare establishment of Jewish State before United Kingdom Forces were clear of Jewish area. Withdrawal of United Kingdom Forces from South to North through area allotted to Jews could only be to advantage of latter. Presence of United Kingdom Forces in North Palestine until last moment would block Arabs and prevent them taking action at most propitious moment, i.e. before Jewish State was formed. (b)/

(b)✓

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Reference:-

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(ii)/

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- 3 -

(ii) Presence of our troops in Palestine while Commission was functioning might involve danger he hoped to avoid, a clash between United Kingdom forces and Arabs, since former would have to protect Commission.

(iii) Saleh Jabr also said he feared that Arab opinion was beginning to swing against Great Britain because we had made no statement on respective merits of Jewish and Arab cases, nor referred to results which would follow implementation of partition. Further we were going to allow Commission to arrive and work while our administration was still there.

(iv) Result would be that a great deal of impetus would be given to Soviet proaganda. People in Iraq were already saying that since United Kingdom and United States had let them down they could not do worse with U.S.S.R.

Brigadier Clayton commented that he found Iraqi Prime Minister more stubborn and unyielding than ever before. He begged Saleh Jabr to work for moderation and urged that Arab League should not commit itself irretrievably.

6. Syria and Transjordan. Communication aroused no strong immediate reactions.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)
Mr. B.A.B. Burrows
Mr. R.A. Henderson

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29 DEC 1947

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F. 2781

CYPHER (TYPEX)

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA " "
NEW ZEALAND " "
SOUTH AFRICA " "

INDEXED

(Sent 10.50 a.m., 25th Dec., 1947)

D. No. 988 TOP SECRET.

PALESTINE. TOP SECRET

1. In conversation with United States Secretary of State while in London Foreign Secretary explained that Arab reactions to United Nations decision on Palestine had been even worse than we had expected. Mr. Bevin said that he was proposing to see various Arab representatives individually in London to steady them. (My telegram 20th December D. No. 932 Saving). Mr. Bevin went on to say that the situation might blow up throughout the Middle East with serious reactions to United States as well as British position. Soviet Union had supported partition because they expected to profit from Jewish-Arab disturbances. Mr. Bevin said that he was anxious about Jewish communities throughout Middle East.
 2. Mr. Marshall said that he had not had many reports but had not thought that situation was so bad. He would keep careful watch.
 3. Mr. Bevin said that some Arab statesmen alleged that, after Mr. Marshall had left United States, pressure had been put on many members of United Nations to vote for partition (my telegram 17th December D. No. 616 Saving). Mr. Marshall replied that the Arabs had also applied pressure. He had refused to give a lead and had so instructed United States officials.
 4. His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador, Washington, has also been instructed to speak to United States State Department informally
- SPECIAL and

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Copy to :-

Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)
Mr. B.A.B. Burrows

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
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Arabs by force, and that when Arabs insisted on principles of right and justice and put world on guard against consequences of Zionist adventure, they were only wanting right and justice for every one. Since passions and interest predominated even in United Nations and the gates of right and justice have been closed before them, Arabs are firmly resolved to enter the fight into which they have been drawn and will continue until final victory. Then the principles of United Nations will be stabilised and principles of justice and equality will reign in the Holy Land. Ends.

Copy to :

Foreign Office

Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)
Mr. J.G.S. Beith



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(BY AIR MAIL) O.D.

O.D.

TQ:

CANADA	(GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA	"
NEW ZEALAND	"
SOUTH AFRICA	"

12064 951 31

13 JAN 1948 (Sent 10th Jan., 1948.)

D. No. 14 SAVING TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET

My telegram 20th December D. No. 628 Saving.

PALESTINE.

Following is summary of information we have now received on Arab League meetings in Cairo. Begins.

(1) It was decided that arms should be supplied to Arab resistance in Palestine by Arab Governments in agreed proportions. Volunteers would be allowed to go to Syria for training in guerilla warfare, and subsequently to Palestine. Arab Governments would contribute to fund of £2,000,000 to finance these activities.

(2) Military advice was to effect that, while this action might enable Arabs of Palestine to hold their own, partition could not be prevented without intervention of regular armies of Arab States. Delegates recognised, however, that intervention of this kind would lead to some reaction from Security Council. It was consequently decided that, for time being at least, open use of Arab armies could not form part of plans.

(3) Question was considered whether Transjordan, on account of her special position, might take open action, even if the other States were not in a position to co-operate. It appears that no clear decision was reached on this question. It is understood that no Delegation raised a definite objection, though it was agreed that any administration set up in Palestine would only be on temporary basis pending consultation with Palestinians.

(4) No decision was taken relating to future Government of Palestine. It was realised that discussion of this subject would have led to serious differences of opinion, and it was consequently thought better to concentrate on resistance to partition plan. Ends.

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reference:-

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2. Following is our estimate of present position of Arab Leaders.
Begins.

(1) Generally speaking, they feel very strongly about Palestine, but they have also clear desire to turn their attention to problems of economic development and social reform. They would therefore like settlement of Palestine problem which did not involve too great economic dislocation and which did not serve to increase influence of extremists on either side. Popular feeling in Arab countries is, however, so strong that, leaving aside question whether it was originally instigated by intemperate propaganda from above, leaders cannot accept settlement which appears to allow major part of Jewish claims. Most of Arab leaders are convinced, probably with considerable justification, that if they accepted any such solution, their positions, and possibly in some cases their lives, would be most insecure. Any change of regime which ensued would undoubtedly be in direction of greater extremism, either Communist or fanatical pan-Islamic.

(2) In these circumstances, even more responsible Arab leaders feel absolutely bound to permit or encourage activities of Arab irregulars in Palestine (though possibly not to any great degree until 15th May), for two reasons:

(a) any policy short of this would give too great a handle to extremist opposition in their countries;

(b) only way they can see of reaching quick and more or less acceptable settlement is by conciliation based on readiness of Jews to move from extreme position for which they have obtained United Nations support. In Arab eyes only way in which Jews can be persuaded to make such a move is that life should be made thoroughly uncomfortable for them in Palestine and that United States Government should come to conclusion that United Nations plan will not work and that they must therefore put pressure on Jews to accept something less. Ends.

Copy to:- Foreign Office

Sir Noel Charles
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (2)
Mr. J.G.S. Beith
Mr. R.A. Henderson

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13

1947

PALESTINE

12101

22 DEC

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 12101/95/31

PRO

banned

22 Dec

U.N. Commission

Australia to PRO No 347 of 16 Dec.
from Acting P.M. to P.M.Transmit observations of P.M. Committee
to deal with suggestion that U.N. P.M. Committee
should delay its arrival in Palestine.
Have reasons for suggesting U.N. Committee
should be constituted rather than delayed.

Last Paper.

12064

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Now see letter within from Mr. Mathison,
C.O. His draft reply has been amended by
Mr. Shannon and myself, and we have
agreed to submit in our respective Offices the
attached fair draft.

H.B. Enby 23/12

H.B. Enby

23.12

I have told Mr Shannon
we concur. He is shortening
para. 2 & sending the draft to
No 10.

X

H.B. Enby

24.12

J.P.P. K. P.M. PRO. to J.K. Humphrey 24/12.

29470 F.O.P.

P.T.O.

(Action
completed.)

G.E. 30/12

(Index)

H.B. Enby 24/12

Next Paper.

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H.B. 207

Reference:-
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(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and unless it is marked O.T.P. (One Time Pad) the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

INWARD TELEGRAM 12101

CYPHER (TYPEX)

22 DEC

FROM : AUSTRALIA (GOVT)
TO : COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE
D. 7.40.p.m. 16th December, 1947

R. 2.15.p.m. 16th December, 1947

No. 347

Personal from Acting Prime Minister to Prime Minister.
Palestine.

Following observations are submitted to you personally as matter is of special importance and as I was Chairman of Palestine Committee.

1. Suggestion that United Nations Commission should delay arrival in Palestine should be looked at in light decision of United Nations Assembly and also of statement made by United Kingdom Representatives Cadogan and Martin to sub Committee I of Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine. So far as latter Committee is concerned Cadogan and Martin expressed themselves as favouring gradual assumption of functions in Palestine by United Nations Commission as opposed to transfer of all functions at one time.
2. Consequently amendment of Partition Plan of Government was made for very purpose of satisfying Cadogan and Martin as to method of transferring all functions from United Kingdom to United Nations Commission and they intimated that they were satisfied on point involved. Accordingly plan was amended.
3. With regard to United Nations Commission it will be pointed out that that body has definite duties assigned to it by United Nations Assembly resolution and it seems to be essence of Assembly resolution that Commission should establish in Palestine soon as possible so that it can prepare itself to carry out its duties in accord with recommendation of Assembly.
4. Australian Delegation at New York like those of Canada

/S. Africa

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-2-

South Africa and New Zealand did their utmost to obtain approval of every United Kingdom request dealing with protection of United Kingdom troops and United Kingdom authority.

5. Most important there is suggestion in present cable of arrangements with Arab Governments (see paragraph 6) as result of which Arabs are almost given intimation to prepare now for commencement of hostilities and threats to peace soon as United Nations Commission take over. Almost inevitable result of this would be to bring into contempt authority of United Nations and its Commission, to imperil their preparatory work and to depart from arrangements made in Sub-Committee and Assembly as to gradual transfer of authority.

6. Another real difficulty is that countries represented on United Nations Commission are not intended to act in their separate capacities but merely as collective agency of Assembly. If approach is made individually to each of these countries to support delay this may possibly intensify confusion and set stage for opening of full scale hostilities at time that is most convenient to Arabs who have already been guilty of openly threatening attitude to United Nations.

7. In circumstances we suggest utmost care and discretion should be exercised to see that subject to essential duty of safeguarding British troops working of United Nations Commission should be accelerated rather than delayed.

Copy to :

C.R.O. (Downing St) Special Ltd Dist.
Prime Minister's Private Secretary
Secretary of State
Parly U.S. of S.
P.U.S.
D.U.S.

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25842/154/13

KEY WORDS: *Chlamydia trachomatis*; *Neisseria meningitidis*; *Neisseria gonorrhoeae*; *Haemophilus influenzae*; *Streptococcus pneumoniae*

ly
Becky

Yours sincerely,
W.A.C. Mathieson
(W.A.C. Mathieson)

J.B. SHANNON, ESQ.

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Reference:-					
FO 371/61893					

3148 Wt, 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

Nov 15
Sun

23.12

I am sorry if you formed the impression from the statements made by Cadogan and Martin during the New York discussions that we favoured the gradual assumption of functions in Palestine by United Nations Commission. There was admittedly a period during the discussions in sub-committee when we were examining the possibility of a progressive transfer of responsibilities, but our conception of "progressive" was geographical and not functional. We came to the conclusion however that even this form of piecemeal transfer was impossible so long as the United Kingdom was responsible as Mandatory for the Government of Palestine. We consequently instructed Cadogan to make it clear that so long as we continued to hold the Mandate for Palestine we must insist on undivided control of the country. When the first report of Sub-Committee One was being examined by the ad hoc Committee on 20th November Cadogan stated our attitude on this point and it was in the light of this statement that the Sub-Committee revised their report. Martin re-emphasized this point on the 22nd November when he said: "The authority of the Mandatory power continues unimpaired until the Mandate is terminated and then it is reduced stage by stage applying only to a limited extent in those areas under military occupation.

/ Progressive

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Reference:-					
FO 371/61893					

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Progressive transfer, in the sense in which it is used in these articles (B2 and B13), would in our view begin after termination of the Mandate."

2. To explain our attitude on this matter I cannot do better than refer you to the relevant section of the speech made in the House of Commons by the Colonial Secretary on the 11th December. He said:

"In order that the withdrawal may be conducted in the most orderly manner, and with the least disruption of the ordinary life of the country, it is essential that the Mandatory power should retain undivided control of the country until the evacuation is well under way. It will be appreciated that the mandatory responsibility for government in Palestine cannot be relinquished piecemeal. The whole complex of governmental responsibilities must be relinquished by the Mandatory Government for the whole of Palestine on an appointed day. As I have indicated, once our military withdrawal is properly under way, the forces necessary for exercising this responsibility will no longer be adequately available, and it will not, therefore, be possible to retain full mandatory responsibility after a certain date. The Mandate will, therefore, be terminated some time in advance of the completion of the withdrawal, and the date we have in mind for this, subject to negotiation with the United Nations Commission is 15th May.

I would repeat that, in our view,
/ undivided

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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371/61893

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3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

3. When we expressed to the Arab Governments the hope that they would not make trouble while we were still in charge, we certainly did not intend to encourage them to make trouble when~~ed~~ we withdrew. We shall of course continue to use our influence to persuade them to act with restraint when our responsibility ends. At the same time we must bear in mind when making representations to them the importance both to the United Kingdom and to the Commonwealth generally of good relations with the Arab world.

/ transfer

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Dec 23.

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Fair copy please

H. Beeley 22/12

Thank you for your message in your telegram No. 347. May I thank you also for the very valuable cooperation between our delegations in New York.

I am ^{sorry if you} surprised that you should have formed the impression from the statements made by Cadogan and Martin during the New York discussions that we favoured the gradual assumption of functions in Palestine by United Nations Commission. There was admittedly a period during the discussions in sub-committee when we were examining the possibility of a progressive transfer of responsibilities, but our conception of "progressive" was geographical and not functional. We came to the conclusion however that even this form of piecemeal transfer was impossible so long as the United Kingdom was responsible as Mandatory for the Government of Palestine. We consequently instructed Cadogan to make it clear that so long as we continued to hold the Mandate for Palestine we must insist on undivided control of the country. When the first report of Sub-Committee One was being examined by the ad hoc Committee on 20th November Cadogan stated our attitude on this point and it was in the light of this statement that the Sub-Committee revised their report. Martin re-emphasized this point on the ^{22nd} 21st November when he said: "The authority of the Mandatory power continues unimpaired until the Mandate is terminated and then it is reduced stage by stage applying only to a limited extent in those areas under

/military

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2. To explain our attitude on this matter I cannot do better than refer you to the relevant section of the speech made in the House of Commons by the Colonial Secretary on the 11th December. He said:

"In order that the withdrawal may be conducted in the most orderly manner, and with the least disruption of the ordinary life of the country, it is essential that the Mandatory power should retain undivided control of the country until the evacuation is well under way. It will be appreciated that the mandatory responsibility for government in Palestine cannot be relinquished piecemeal. The whole complex of governmental responsibilities must be relinquished by the Mandatory Government for the whole of Palestine on an appointed day. As I have indicated, once our military withdrawal is properly under way, the forces necessary for exercising this responsibility will no longer be adequately available, and it will not, therefore, be possible to retain full mandatory responsibility after a certain date. The Mandate will, therefore, be terminated some time in advance of the completion of the withdrawal, and the date we have in mind for this, subject to negotiation with the United Nations Commission is 15th May.

/I would

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3. When we expressed to the Arab Governments the hope that they would not make trouble while we were still in charge, we certainly did not intend to encourage them to make trouble when we withdrew. We shall of course continue to use our influence ~~to~~ to persuade them to act with restraint when our responsibility ends.

3. We shall of course continue to not abandon our attempt to ~~improve~~ ^{improve} the Arab governments to act with restraint when we are responsible for Palestine comes to an end. I am at the same time I am sure you will agree that we must bear in mind when making representations to them, it must be made in such a way will due consideration for the importance both to the U.K. and to the Commonwealth generally of good relations with the Arab world.

43. I can assure you that as soon as the United Nations have set up the Commission we shall negotiate with it with a view to reaching some mutually satisfactory arrangement for the transfer of power. We have no desire to impede the work of the Commission but we feel that it is in their interest as much as in ours that they should be fully seized of the problems ahead of them before they assume responsibility in Palestine where their arrival is bound to provoke reactions which they must be prepared to meet. ^{and} We are forming a team of negotiators to proceed to New York for this purpose early in January. We shall continue to use our influence with the Arab States to induce in them a sense of responsibility and I am sure you will share my view of the

~~/ importance~~

Reference:-

371/61893



Office of the
Minister of Defence

enter
26
Mr. O. Largent
Mr. Wright
S. J. P.
It
1/2
Mr. B. J. J.
DEC

With the Private Secretary's
compliments.

12/01 957 71

24. 12. 47.

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Reference:-
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371/61893

24th December, 1947.

I saw the telegram No. 347 from the Acting Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister, dated 16th December. In view of the decision taken at the Defence Committee (D.O.(47) 25th Meeting, Minute 1) I asked for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on this matter and I attach a copy of their report. I agree with their views.

Yours sincerely,

The Rt.Hon.Philip J. Noel-Baker,MP.

P.S. I have sent copies to the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary.

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Commonwealth Relations Office, ²⁹ E

Downing Street, S.W.1.

24th December, 1947.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

12/01 957 71

Dear Pumphrey,

With reference to your letter of the 18th December, Mr. Noel-Baker has asked me to send you the enclosed draft reply to Dr. Evatt's telegram No. 347 of the 16th December, about Palestine. This has been agreed with the Colonial Office and Foreign Office.

If the Prime Minister approves, and you will let us know, we will send it off.

In the expectation that it would be possible to send a reply to Dr. Evatt this week, an interim acknowledgment has not been sent.

Yours sincerely,

K. EAST.

J. L. Pumphrey, Esq.

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Reference:-
FO 371/61893

Draft Telegram from Prime Minister to
Acting Prime Minister of Australia.

No.

Secret and Personal from Prime Minister for
 Acting Prime Minister.

Thank you for your message in your telegram
 No. 347 about Palestine. May I say first how much
 we valued the co-operation between our Delegations in
 New York.

2. I am sorry if you formed the impression from
 the statements made by Cadogan and Martin during the
 New York discussions that we favoured the gradual
 assumption of functions in Palestine by United Nations
 Commission. There was admittedly a period during the
 discussions in sub-committee when we were examining
 the possibility of a progressive transfer of
 responsibilities, but our conception of "progressive"
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 was responsible as Mandatory for the Government of
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 it clear that so long as we continued to hold the
 Mandate for Palestine we must insist on undivided
 control of the country. When the first report of
 Sub-Committee One was being examined by the ad hoc
 Committee on 20th November, Cadogan stated our
 attitude on this point and it was in the light of this

/statement

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6
Reference:-					
FO 371/61893					
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5. I can assure you that as soon as the United Nations have set up the Commission we shall negotiate with it with a view to reaching some mutually satisfactory arrangement for the transfer of power. We have no desire to impede the work of the Commission but we feel that it is in their interest as much as in ours that they should be fully seized of the problems ahead of them before they assume responsibility in Palestine, where their arrival is bound to provoke reactions which they must be prepared to meet. We are forming a team of negotiators to proceed to New York for this purpose early in January.


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Reference:-

F0

371/61893



33

Σ. Dept.

Pa.

18/12.

Mr. Henniker,
Foreign Office.

12101 95-1 31

With
the compliments of
Mr. Pumphrey.

10, Downing Street,
S.W.1.

18th December, 1947.

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371/61893

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

18th December, 1947.

The Prime Minister has seen Australia (Government) Telegram, No. 547, containing a personal message from the acting Prime Minister of Australia to himself about Palestine. The Prime Minister would be glad if you would kindly submit a draft reply for his consideration, in consultation with the other interested departments. If this is likely to take more than a few days, perhaps you would think it worth while to send an interim acknowledgment through our High Commissioner in Canberra.

I am sending copies of this letter to Henniker (Foreign Office), Watson (Colonial Office), and Richard Wood (Ministry of Defence).

(Sgd) J.L. PURPLEY.

R.A. East, Esq.,
Commonwealth Relations Office.

34
12.11.47
E

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Reference:-

FO

371/61893

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371/61893



December 16, 1947.

My Reference 75872/154/26.

Your Reference

My dear Beley,

I enclose two copies of telegram No. 2415 Secret, from the High Commissioner for Palestine on the subject of the future of Jerusalem. It appears to arise out of a letter sent from Gibson to Gurney asking for the views of the Government of Palestine on certain points which had arisen in New York.

We note from New York telegram to Foreign Office No. 3662 of December 15 that the Working Committee has now completed its discussion on general principles and has appointed two sub-committees to deal with the actual drafting ~~and~~ which will go into recess from December 22 to January 4. We have already sent a telegram to New York saying that we would welcome Gibson's return as soon as the sub-committees go into recess. There is no point in the High Commissioner's telegram on which we need send our views to Mr. Gibson before he returns but in accordance with the request in the last paragraph, I think we should telegraph the text immediately to New York. I enclose a draft telegram accordingly and if you agree, perhaps you will arrange for it to be sent off.

Yours ever,
W.A.C. Mathieson
(W.A.C. Mathieson)

H. BEELEY, ESQ., CBE.

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Reference:-

F0

371/61893

INWARD TELEGRAMTO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

D. 13th December, 1947.

R. 13th " " 15.00 hrs.

No. 2415 Secret.

Jerusalem.

It seems essential that a Governor should be appointed and be available to assume duty here by 15th May. If this is not possible responsibility for the administration of the city will belong to the Commission until a Governor arrives. I recognise that I have laboured the point that under either eventuality, unless there is a police force in effective operation in Jerusalem on that date, bloodshed and destruction cannot be prevented and will be laid at our door; but since I have little evidence that the importance of this is understood by U.N.O. I refer to it again. It is all very well to say that this is a matter for the Commission but it must surely be difficult to reconcile with our consciences a proposition which we know will endanger the Holy Places of Christianity, namely, that Jerusalem should be taken over by a body with no force at its disposal. If we are faced with no alternative to such a proposition, I should propose to assist Jerusalem Municipality to form its own police force of Jews and Arabs which would at least be better than nothing.

2. The question of "residence" and "citizenship" is not of great importance provided that seats in the Legislative Council are reserved on the lines proposed in my telegram No. 2341. Reservation of Christian seats to any particular denominations should be and can be avoided.

3. In spite of the obvious objections I do not see how we can escape a third official language. The Governor would have to use one of the official languages and to limit him to Arabic or Hebrew (apart from accusations of partiality) would narrow the field of candidates almost to the point of disappearance. Nearly all educated people in Jerusalem know English.

4. Please repeat to Gibson referring to his letter to Gurney of 6th December.

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Reference:-

FO 371/61893

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

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4. Please repeat to Gibson referring to his letter to Gurney of 6th December.

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FO

371/61893

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

CYPHER

39

OUT FILE

194

Despatched

M.

Draft.

Sir A. Cadogan,
New York.

Telegram.

No. 434

(Date) Dec 8

Repeat to :—

RECEIVED IN O.R.
19 DEC 1947

SENT TO DEPT.

En Clair.
Conf.
Cypher.

Distribution :—

Trustship

Copies to :—

Immediate
Send
Build

Following for Gibson from Mathieson,
[Colonial Office.]

Following is text of telegram which has been received from High Commissioner in comment on your letter to Gurney of December 6. Begins. It seems essential that a Governor should be appointed and be available to assume duty here by May 15. If this is not possible responsibility for the administration of the city will belong to the Commission until a Governor arrives. I recognize that I have laboured the point that under either eventuality, unless there is a police force in effective operation in Jerusalem on that date, bloodshed and destruction cannot be prevented and will be laid at our door; but since I have little evidence that the importance of this is understood by U.N. I refer to it again. It is all very well to say that this is a matter for the Commission but it must surely be difficult to reconcile with our consciences a proposition which we know will endanger the Holy Places of Christianity, namely, that Jerusalem should be taken over by a body with no force at its disposal. If we are faced with no alternative to such a proposition, I should propose to assist Jerusalem Municipality to form its own police force of Jews and Arabs

/which

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Reference:-

FO

371/61893

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40

H.B. 187
112

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Reference:-

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371/61893

448

E

42

1947

PALESTINE

12108

22 DEC

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E12108/951/31

L.H. Foulds

Monito

244

5, Dec

22 -

Palestine, Philippine Note
 Re: Manila 01 244 (E11275/951/31)
 Now transmits copy of statement issued
 by President Roxas in Boguio on 11/1.
 indicating a complete reversal of the Philippine
 stand!

Last Paper.

12107

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, 60

✓ done 23

9/4.2.48. New York
 no. 8 (with ref.)
 ✓ Jan. 6

C. H. Hadow.

W. H. Hadow.

✓ Jan. 6

(Action
completed.)

L. H. Foulds 6/1

(Index)

L. H. Foulds 6/1

Next Paper.

12112

(Minutes.)

I hope they are pleased by their reward.

U.S. Political Dept.

J. H. Hadow.

? copy also in N. York. with ref.

L. H. Foulds.

H.B. 22/12

Yes, and to W. H. Hadow for
 Mr. Hadow.

H.B. 27/1

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371/61893



CONFIDENTIAL
No. 244.

BRITISH LEGATION

MANILA

5th December, 1947.

12108

22 DEC

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 244 of the 28th November reporting a statement made to me by Mr. Quirino, Vice-President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, to the effect that the Philippine delegate to the United Nations' Organisation had been instructed to vote against the partition of Palestine if his adverse vote would prevent the achievement of a two-thirds majority in favour of partition, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a statement issued by President Roxas in Baguio on the 1st December indicating a complete reversal of the Filipino stand. The publication of this statement has unleashed a flood of speculation in the local press, one paper suggesting that the American Ambassador, who was in Baguio when it was issued, may have had a good deal to do with it.

2. On the face of it there would seem to be grounds for believing that the United States Government may have put pressure on the Philippine Government to abandon opposition to a policy favoured by the United States. But I am inclined to think that the Philippine Government also had a belated attack of cold feet.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

L. A. Gould

The Right Honourable Ernest Bevin, P.C., M.P.,
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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Reference:-

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Palestine.
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urgent message
as head of

Reference:—

371/61893

In explanation of our affirmative vote,
 "I received this morning a message from Senator Confesor
 "which reads as follows: 'The Palestine partition was
 "approved by 33 to 13. If the Philippines, Haiti and
 "Liberia had voted negatively as previously announced,
 "the committee recommendations would have been defeated.
 "The Philippine delegation has been widely congratulated
 "for the affirmative vote showing our high sense of re-
 "sponsibility in the discharge of our obligations to
 "the United Nations. The Philippines has been appointed
 "a member of the Palestine commission."

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 371/61893

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61893

449

1947

E

PALESTINE

12112

22 DEC

46

Registry
Number

E12112/951/31

FROM

J.E.B. Shannon

No.

B.R.O.

Dated

L.M. Burrows.

Received
in Registry

15 Dec

22 -

Jalil Salu and the 'Dominant Vote'
 understand from B.R.O. to 596 (E11727/11280/65)
 that Jalil Salu said that the Arab Federation
 that the fact that the 'Dominant Vote' was for
 Partition, showed that the U.K. had done nothing
 to influence them against partition, and that we
 were not agreed with it.
 Proposed draft to be sent back.

Last Paper.

12/108

(Minutes.)

C.R. Dept.

H.23. 22/12

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

7el B.M.E.O. 903.
 Rtd, Amman 574
 Bagdad 1192
 Beirut 785
 Cairo 2286
 Damascus 643
 Adala 531.
 19 Dec.

8 B.R.O.
 1 B.R.O. ✓ 23

(Action
completed.)

J.E.B. 2/1

(Index.)

J.E.B. 2/1

Next Paper.

12113

29470 F.O.P.

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Reference:-

FO 371/61893

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12:12
Commonwealth Relations Office,

Downing Street.

22 DEC

15th December, 1947.

Dear Burrows,

PALESTINE.

I see from B.M.E.O. telegram No.596 of 10th December that Salih Jabr said that the Arabs believed that the fact that "the Dominions" voted for the partition of Palestine showed that the United Kingdom had done nothing to influence them against partition, and that we probably agreed with partition.

2. The fact is that two Dominions (India and Pakistan) voted against partition and four (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa) voted for it. In any case, it is quite wrong for Salih Jabr to think that any of the Dominions voted otherwise than in accordance with their own judgment, or that we brought any influence to bear on any of them, one way or the other, in this particular matter.

3. In view of Salih Jabr's misapprehension, we suggest that it might be useful if the Foreign Office could telegraph to B.M.E.O. on the lines of the draft telegram which I enclose for your consideration. You will see that we suggest that this might also be repeated to His Majesty's Representatives in the Arab States, but we do not press for repetition if you think it unnecessary. In that case, the

first

B.A.B. BURROWS, ESQ.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

1	2	3	4	5	6

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Reference:-
FO
371/61893

CYPHER ⁴⁹

DRAFT TELEGRAM

OUT FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

Despatched

M

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TO BRITISH MIDDLE EAST ^{office} FORCE,

CAIRO. ~~2286~~ 903.

Adm. BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,

REPEATED TO -

Amman 574
BAGDAD 1192
BEIRUT 785
CAIRO 2286
DAMASCUS 643
JEDDA 531

CAIRO 61 no 903 of 19th Dec repeated
for info to Amman Bagdad Beirut Cairo
NO. Damascus and Jeddah

REPEATED -

Amman

BAGDAD

BEIRUT

CAIRO

DAMASCUS

JEDDA

No.

NO.

NO.

NO.

NO.

NO.

~~British Middle East Office, Cairo.~~

Tour Telegram No. 596.

It is evident from Salih Jabr's statement to Clayton that Arabs believed that fact of some Dominions voting against them showed that we had done nothing to influence their opinion the other way, that former is under some mis-conception as to the position of the Dominions.

2. Position is that the Dominions are sovereign states, completely independent of H.M.G. in the United Kingdom. India and Pakistan, voted with the Arabs against partition, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa voted for partition. In

Cypher

Dypl. no 2

Aprio to

C.R.D.

C.O.

RECEIVED 33

22 DEC 1947

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Reference:-
FO 371/61893

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In conformity with attitude
which we have adopted
throughout, we did not
attempt to influence
attitude of any of them one
way or the other..

3. We do not want to pick
on this one point of Salih Jabr's
but you could speak to him in
foregoing sense if suitable
opportunity presents itself or if
you find other Arab leaders
labouring under similar mis-
conception.

4. [BMEQ Cairo only] Please pass to the Embassy as my tel no 2286

BB. 19/12

Sender

Date

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Reference:-

FO 371/61893

51

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

No. 905

D: 7.10 a.m. 20th December, 1947

IMPORTANT
CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 596.

2. Position is that the Dominions are sovereign states, completely independent of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. India and Pakistan, voted with the Arabs against partition, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa voted for partition. In conformity with attitude which we have adopted throughout, we did not attempt to influence attitude of any of them one way or the other.

3. We do not want to pick on this point of Salih Jabr's but you could speak in forgiving sense if suitable opportunity presents itself or if you find other Arab leaders labouring under similar misconception.

4. [British Middle East Office Cairo only] Please pass to the Embassy as my telegram No. 2286.

G G G G

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61893

4570

1947

E

PALESTINE

12113

22 DEC

52

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

12113/951/31

70 Minute

111 Bedley

16 Dec

22 -

Public Circumstances, Left and Colonial Secretary
known note for Secretary of States
meeting with Colonial Secretary 17 Dec.

Last Paper.

12112

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

10/10/22/12

(Index)

10/10/22/12

Next Paper.

12115

(Minutes.)

H.B. 22/12

In P.P. 70 Minute 11/12/12

H.B. 20/12

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Reference:-

FO

371/61893

[illegible]

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

12113 951 71

INE 6400 P.W. 53

Eastern Department.

Palestine.

The Secretary of State has written the following minute:-

position "I had better review the Palestine condition with Creech Jones in the next day or two. Bring me up to date today as to what is happening in New York as well as in Palestine.

E.B."

A meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr. Creech Jones has been arranged for 5 o'clock tomorrow, the 17th December. Could we please have a brief by this evening?

ftb.

16th December, 1947.

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Reference:-

F0

371/61893

412

E

55A

12:19

22 DEC

1947

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

E1249/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No.

New York.

Dated

3688

Received
in Registry

19 Dec

22 -

U.N. Palestine Commission

Re New York tel 3649 (E11822/951/31) re Gen.
Part night told representatives of 5 countries who
are permanent members of Security Council that
he was summoning Commission to meet Jan 7
in New York. Still no official notification
any appointment to Commission. He thought Commission
would have good deal of preliminary work in
New York before leaving for Palestine.

Last Paper.

12/15

(Minutes.)

U.N. Political Dept.

123-227
12

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8. Attached as 80
Covered by off.
M.I. 39
M.O.
Admty
D.W.
✓ Dec 24

(Action
completed.)

2/29/12

(Index)

2/9/48

Next Paper

E 12141

30471 F.O.P.

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Reference:-

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371/61893

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56
112150
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22 JUL 1966

22 JUL 1966

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22 JUL 1966

A circular postmark from London, dated 22 DEC 1894. The text "LONDON" is at the top, "22 DEC 1894" is in the center, and "ENGLAND" is at the bottom. The numbers 1 through 12 are arranged around the inner circle, with the hands pointing to approximately 10:10.

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Reference:-

F70

371 / 61893

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45-7

1947

E

PALLOTT

22 DEC

57

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E12141/951/31

Trefford Smith

60

London

1947

22 -

Political discussion, Pop & and Mr. Brock
Jones.Memorandum outline of principal points
discussed with a discussion between Secretary of
State for Palestine and Mr. Brock on
Dec 18, 1947.

Last Paper

(E12124/49/31)
12/11/9

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Ad Beirut	749
Rptd. Beirut	2312
Bagdad	1219
Damascus	652
Amman	583
Tadla	545
RMEU	930

24 Dec

4.80. Dec 29

(Action
completed.)

L. G. M. S.

(Index)

Next Paper.

E12160

(Minutes.)

See especially the decision about a
possible approach to the Mufti. According to
the record, this was made with reference to
the High Commissioner's suggestion for an
approach to the Mufti through the Arab League
(E11989), and does not cover Mr. Housboun-
Boswall's proposal for informal but direct
contact with him in Beirut (E11611).

Nevertheless I think we may assume that
Ministers intended to rule out all ~~contact~~
approaches to the Mufti for the time being,
and I have drafted accordingly. L.O. concurred
and will inform Jerusalem.

H.B. C. 227
12L. G. M. S.
24 Dec

Re latest Tel. from Amman says

H.B.

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Reference:-

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371/61893

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22 DEC

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59

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Reference:-

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371/61893

60 60

The Secretary General had called a meeting for January 7 at which (assuming the Commission had been appointed and its members had arrived in New York) negotiations would be ~~started~~. The first item on the agenda would of course be the general time-table of the Commission's arrival in Palestine, possibly preceded by officials. On this Sir A. Cadogan was already fully briefed. As regards the financial, economic and administrative matters which would arise, these were being handled by the Overseas Negotiations Committee, and a brief for Sir A. Cadogan was already in draft. The Secretary of State expressed anxiety that no time should be lost in the completion of the brief and that consideration should now be given to the formation of a party of experts to conduct the negotiations. It would clearly be necessary for a financial and economic official, possibly the Financial Secretary to the Palestine Government, to go to New York and experts from London would also be necessary. Both Ministers attached particular importance to the appointment of a Treasury representative to the negotiating party.

I undertook to take up these questions forthwith and let the Secretary of State see a copy of the draft brief for negotiations in its present form. Mr. Gutch will no doubt deal with this.

I have discussed with the Foreign Office who agree that it will be useful to raise the question of personnel for the negotiating party with the High Commissioner Northwith. I submit a draft telegram.

19.12.47

RECEIVED IN O.B.
22 DEC 1947
SENT TO DEPT.

COPTIMISM OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON					
1	2	3	4	5	6
Reference:-					
FO 371/61893					

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

9149 Wt. 26469/137 100m 946 (51) F.S.

Registry
No. E 12141/95/31

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

Telegram. Beirut
No. 799
(Date) Dec 24

Repeat to:-

Bairo 2312
Bagdad 1219
Damascus 652
Amman 583
Jidda 545
BMEQ 930
Jerusalem
Code
Cypher.

Distribution:-

Dept. no 1
This tel should
be repeated to
Jerusalem

Copies to:-

H.B. 22/12
C.B.
Rafa
J.H.B. 22.12

OUT FILE

CYPHER

F.O.

194

Despatched

M.

~~Top Secret~~

Addressed to Beirut telegram no 799
of Dec 24, for info
Bagdad, Damascus, Amman, Jidda, BMEQ, Jerusalem
Bagdad

My telegram no [Beirut] 757
446 to 1321 to F.O. [Bairo] 865
[of Dec 20: Mufti] [Bagdad] 1146
[Damascus] 615
[Amman] 548
[Jidda] 513
[BMEQ] 865 to Cairo

No contact should

be maintained between me and

have decided that no steps should
be taken at present to establish

contact with the Mufti. Mufti
[Bairo only] Please pass to BMEQ tel no 930
Dec 22

RECEIVED IN C.B.
27 DEC 1947
SENT TO DEPT.

with night 23.12

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Reference:-
FO 371/61893

62

OUT FILE

CYPHER/OTP

E.12141/951/31.

Secret.

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BEIRUTNo. 799.

D: 9.15 p.m. 25th December, 1947.

24th December, 1947.

Repeated to: Cairo No. 2,312,
 Bagdad No. 1,219,
 Damascus No. 652,
 Amman No. 583,
 Jedda No. 545,
 B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 930,
 Jerusalem.

SECRET

Addressed to Beirut telegram No. 799 of December 24th,
 repeated for information to Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, Amman,
 Jedda, B.M.E.O. Cairo, and Jerusalem.

Bagdad telegram No. 1321 to Foreign Office [of
 December 20th: Mufti].

No contact should at present be established with
 the Mufti.

[Cairo only] Please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 930.

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 Reference:-

FO

371/61893

371 / 61893

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

M. Wright
Eastern Department.

12:00
23 DEC

The Secretary of State discussed with the Colonial Secretary today the future division of responsibility between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office for matters relating to Palestine. It was agreed that, during this next stage, the Secretary of State would be responsible for dealing with the neighbouring Arab States, and that the Colonial Secretary would be responsible for dealing with Jewish and Arab bodies in Palestine. Sir A. Cadogan should be kept closely informed by the Colonial Office of the policy they were following with the Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and should be authorised to deal with Jewish and Arab Representatives in New York. The Secretary of State does not want to see any Jewish Representatives himself. If he has committed himself to doing so in the case of Mr. Goldman he is prepared to see him, but he would prefer not to do so if this can be avoided. The Colonial Secretary agreed to receive Jewish Representatives who might approach either himself or the Secretary of State.

RSC McAlpine

18th December, 1947.

19.12
Mr. T. ...
Mr. Beeley

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO

371/61893

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455

64

112183

23 DEC

PALESTINE

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

in Registry

£12183/95/31

Legation

Damaricus

148

g. xce

23 -

Communication to Arab Govts.
 Refers to the to Cairo 2211 & 2222 (E 11262/
 951/31). Transmits copy of Arab Memorial
 handed to Acting Secy Foreign Affairs
 & also as enclosed from Palestine.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

12160

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Ind ~~2~~)

7 EMB 24/12

7/9/48

Next Paper.

12185

29470 F.O.P.

Reference:-

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371 / 61893

No. 148

(26/313/47)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Damascus
presents his compliments to H.M. Principal Secretary
and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British Legation

Damascus

23 DEC

9th Dec, 1947

Reference to previous correspondence:

Foreign Office teles Nos 2211 and 2222 to
Cairo and Damascus telegram No 552

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.

Subject.

Copy of Aide Memoire
handed to the Acting
Minister of Foreign
Affairs on December
7th 1947.-withdrawal
from Palestine.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO

371/61893

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Confidential.

White Paper.

His Majesty's Government have now been able to take their planning on the withdrawal from Palestine a stage further and in consistence with their friendly relations with the Arab States and with their desire for a smooth and orderly withdrawal from Palestine, wish to take this early opportunity of telling the Governments of the Arab States in confidence the outline of their plans in so far as they have at present been approved.

Plans are being drawn up on the basis of withdrawal taking place as speedily as possible. The time limit is that evacuation should be complete by August 1st next. This will involve leaving behind a considerable quantity of stores, but it is hoped that it will be possible to arrange with the successor authorities for the custody or subsequent evacuation of such stores as cannot be taken away in time.

In order that withdrawal may be carried out within this framework it is necessary on purely military and administrative grounds that the Palestine Government should retain administrative responsibility throughout Palestine for several months. His Majesty's Government have made it clear that during this period they will not allow their forces or administration to be used in enforcing a settlement which is not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. They would naturally have much preferred to terminate their responsibility at an earlier date but for purely practical reasons are unable to do so. The exact date prior to completion of evacuation on which the Mandate will be relinquished and British administration brought to an end will be communicated to Arab Governments as soon as possible.

After the termination of civil administration British troops will be concentrated in a limited area pending evacuation through ships. Within that area the British Military Commander will continue to take such measures as are necessary for the protection and speedy evacuation of British troops and stores.

As will be seen from the above His Majesty's Government are communicating to the Governments of the Arab States with great frankness advance information of the outline of their withdrawal plans. They consequently feel justified in asking in return that the Arab States should not do anything or permit anyone in their territory to do anything calculated to interfere with the orderly withdrawal or to oblige the British authorities while they are still in control to take measures to suppress disturbances in Palestine.

British Legation
Damascus

7th December, 1947.

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FO 371/61893

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68

12185

1947

23 DEC

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E12185/957/31

W. Hall

Copenhagen

H/3

20, Dec

23 ~

U.N. Palestine Commission
 Refer Copenhagen dispatch 406/E1184/917/31
 reports Danish boat anchored on 20 also the
 appointment of Mr Per Fredericq as their representative
 called on the U.N. Commission for Palestine.
 xlin copies + am

Last Paper.

12183

(Minutes.)

References.

Northey Dept. 307x1
 U.N. Palestine
 FORD Min 8/1

H/3. 23/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

P. Hall 9/1

(Index.)

H/3 10/48

Next Paper.

E 12202

29470 F.O.P.

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F0

371/61893



12185

23 DEC

20th December, 1947.

1801/02

69

A vertical ruler with markings from 1 to 2. The ruler is divided into two main sections, each labeled with a number (1 and 2) and containing sub-markings.

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371/61893

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Michael Rie
for the Ambassador.

The Right Honourable Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

417	E	12202 70
	PALESTINE	24 EC

Registry Number E12202/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Bagdad
1332
23 Dec
24 -

Arab Tel. Union Govt.
Re: Jerusalem 11/24/42 (E11631/11/24/42)
Available information does not indicate that any
great progress has been made at Arab League
meeting towards the setting up of an Arab
Administration Govt. It might well be that the
setting up of some kind of Arab Authority would
not be disadvantageous.

Last Paper.

12/85

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Watson. 80
checked off
M130
1104
Admty
u.M.
(E12202) Dec 29

(Action completed)

7/26/48

(Index.)

7/26/48

Next Paper.

12204

(Minutes.)

The difficulty is that any attempt to
decide now on the form, and above all the
personnel, of a Palestinian Government would
cause dissension among the Arabs. For this
reason the Arab League are at present
preparing to set up a military administration
under their general supervision.

H. Beeley 30/12

L. B. Pyman
30/12

The Jerusalem tel. referred
to (in E11631) has been superseded
by the tel. in E12089. I do not
think any further action is
required.

J. H. S.

1.1

3047: K.O.P

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F0
371/61893

12202
24 DEC

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OT: CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Busk, D: 10.12 a.m. 23rd December, 1947
No. 1332.
23rd December, 1947. R: 10.46 a.m. 23rd December, 1947.

Repeated to British Middle East Office,
Jerusalem
Amman Saving.
Beirut, "
Damascus"
Jedda "
Cairo "

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1332 of
December 23rd. Repeated to British Middle East Office,
Jerusalem and Saving to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda
and Cairo.

Secret.

Jerusalem telegram No. 2442.

While information available here does not indicate that any great progress has been made at the Arab League's meeting towards the setting up of an Arab Palestinian Government I must say that I should have thought that the setting up of some kind of authority to take over the Arab parts of Palestine on the termination of the Mandate would not be disadvantageous.

2. Provided that an Arab Palestinian Government, does not attempt to exercise any authority inside Palestine until May 15th it is not immediately apparent how the formation of such a body would add considerably to the dangers of an Anglo-Arab clash in Palestine.

3. Postponement of its formation would appear to have the disadvantage of leaving a vacuum in Arab parts of Palestine which the Arabs have stated their unwillingness to allow the United Nations Commission to fill.

4. In the Jewish Agency the Jews possess an organised body to take over. To the Arabs it would seem inconsistent with our professed neutral attitude should we hinder their efforts to form such a body.

24 DEC 1947
AMMAN
BAGDAD
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
JEDDA
CAIRO

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371/61893

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12204

72

1947

PALESTINE

24 DEC

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E/2204/957/31

40 Minutes

M. Burrows.

19 Dec

24 -

Opening of Port of Tel Aviv to Immigration
discusses possible date at which the
port of Tel Aviv will be open for
uncontrolled Jewish Immigration.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

12202

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

G. B. H. 21/12

[Signature]

Next Paper.

12206

29470 F.O.P.

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Reference:-

F0

371/61893

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[Signature]
(S.E. CABLE)

27/12

H.B. 307/12

PALESTINE

24 DEC

Date at which the port of Tel Aviv is to be open
for uncontrolled Jewish immigration.

The resolution of the United Nations Assembly
concerning Palestine contains the following direction:-

"The Mandatory Power shall use its best
endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the
territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport,
and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for
a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at
the earliest possible date and in any event not
later than 1st February, 1948".

2. The Defence Committee, when it considered future
immigration policy at its meeting of the 11th December,
decided to invite the Chiefs of Staff to consider
whether it would be possible to adjust the plan of
withdrawal from Palestine in such a way as to make the
port of Tel Aviv available to the Jews some weeks
before the termination of the mandate.

3. Answering a question on this subject at the end
of his speech in the House of Commons on the 12th
December, the Secretary of State said:-

"I cannot agree to open a port until we lay
down the mandate. We cannot have two administrations
at one time".

This statement was consistent with what the Secretary
of State had previously told Mr. Marshall on the 4th
December, namely, that "We might also be able to provide
"a port for legal immigration after the United Nations
"Commission had taken over".

4. There seems to be some inconsistency between the
enquiry made of the Chiefs of Staff by the Defence
Committee and the Secretary of State's conclusion on this
question. It would, however, be possible for Tel Aviv
not to be open until after we had laid down the mandate
and nevertheless to be open before the 15th May, if the
mandate itself could be laid down at an earlier date.
If the Secretary of State wishes this possibility to be
examined, we could write to the Chiefs of Staff asking
them to consider it, in addition to the question put to
them by the Defence Committee.

B.A.S. Sumner

19th December, 1947.

W. A. S. Sumner

W.A.S.

22.12

W.A.S. Sumner

B.A.S.

22.12

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Reference:-

FO

371/61893

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PALESTINE

29470 F.O.P.

Colonial Secretary's House of Commons Statement
Referred to 1153 (E11262/957/31) Transmits
copy of Aide Memoire handed to Secretary Gen-
eral Foreign Affairs on 11 Dec as Colonial
Secretary's statement in House of Commons
on Dec 11.

(Minutes.)

7-13. 307
112

Reference:-

371/61893

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No. ~~236~~
(236/173/48)

HIS Majesty's CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 24 at TEC BAGDAD
presents his compliments to H.M.P.S.S.F.A.
and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.


British.....Embassy,

Bagdad.....

12th December 1947

Reference to previous correspondence: Foreign Office telegram to Bagdad No. 1153 of 10th December.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<p>Copy of AIDE MEMOIRE handed to Director General Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Oriental Counsellor 12.30 on 11th December, 1947.</p>	<p>Colonial Secretary's statement in House of Commons on December 11th.</p>
	

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REFERENCE:-
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371/61893

AIDE MEMOIRE.

In pursuance of their policy of informing the Iraqi Government confidentially in advance of the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Palestine, His Majesty's Embassy has been instructed to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that on December 11th or December 12th the Colonial Secretary will make a statement in the House of Commons.

Mr. Creech Jones will announce that Sir A. Cadogan has been sent instructions to inform the United Nations Commission of His Majesty's Government's outlined plan for withdrawal and to express the hope that they will see their way to make their arrangements conform to this plan. Mr. Creech Jones will go on to say that the date on which it is proposed that the Mandate should be terminated is May 15th 1948 and that it would be impossible to allow the Commission to arrive in Palestine until shortly before the termination of the Mandate.

His Majesty's Embassy take this opportunity to confirm to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that no weapons, ammunition or warlike stores will be left in Palestine.

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Reference:-					
FO 371/61893					

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77

1947

24 DEC

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

E 12226/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M. Foulds
Manila

Dated

Received

in Registry

267
25 DEC
24

U.N. Political Commission

Ref No Manila 61 258 (E 11836/957/21) Local press
reports that Antonio Vicente Francisco has been
selected as Philippine representative on U.N.
Political Commission.
He is Majority floor representative and was
member of Philippine Constitutional Convention.

Last Paper.

12206

(Minutes.)

Japan Dep. 11
U.N. Political Dep. 11.31.

References.

H.B. 307/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8. Mutherson. 60
Forwarded to
M. Foulds, Manila
M. 1.3a
M. 0.4
Adm. 11
P. 11
Dec 29

(Action
completed.)

S. 11/1

(Index)

11/14

Next Paper.

12227

30471 F.O.P.

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371/61893

Reference:-

Copy entered E/Jan for (2) 12226

Code R

24 DEC
DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM MANILA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

78

Mr. Foulds
No. 267

D. 7.0 p.m. 23rd December 1947
R. 1.0 p.m. 23rd December 1947

23rd December 1947.

My telegram No. 258; Palestine.

Local press reports that Senator Vicente Francisco has been selected as Philippine representative on United Nations Palestine Commission. Mr. Francisco is Majority floor leader of Senate and was a member of Philippine Constitutional Convention.

2. My telegram No. 253. Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not yet replied.

V V V



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Reference:-

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371/61893

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461

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79

1947

12227

PALESTINE

24 DEC

Registry
Number

E12227/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.A.O.I.

No.

New York

Dated

3697

Received
in Registry

23 DEC

24 -

Jerusalem Statute.

for Poyton from Poyton.

Hypn to Army to London 23rd draft of Jerusalem

Statute prepared by drafting sub-committee

copy will be available to send to Poyton.

from comment on same

Last Paper.

12226

(Minutes.)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Wharfedale, 60

Evened. 60/6/6/6

M. 1.39

M. 1.4

Adm. 1.4

A. 1.4

(on E12226) Dec 29

Tel, New York. 4436

30 DEC

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(Action
completed.)

28/11/47

(Index.)

28/11/47

Next Paper.

E 12233

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Reference:-

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371/61893

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24 DEC

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

IMMEDIATE Washington Saving
BUILD

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3697 of
December 23rd repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

Following for Poynton, Colonial Office from Gibson.

I hope to bring with me to London tonight drafts of Jerusalem statute prepared by drafting sub-committees. copy will be available to send to Palestine. Drafting sub-committees will re-convene on January 5th and 6th and working committee will commence examination of draft on January 7th.

2. Working committee on Jerusalem statute are fully alive to need for preservation of international nature of city and consider communal system of representation on Legislative Council provides the only real safeguard. They also consider wording of United Nations plan is wide enough to permit of this. The drafting committee will recommend council of forty members, of whom eighteen will be elected by Arabs, eighteen by Jews and four persons of other race. They also propose a proportional system of representation on the Swedish pattern to secure fair distribution of seats within the three groups. Proposal in paragraph 2 of Jerusalem telegram addressed to United Kingdom Delegation No. 1817 has been mentioned by a delegate but the United Nations plan appears to exclude possibility of nominated members and to contemplate that all members will be elected.

3. Drafting committee will propose that all members of council must be citizens of the city. For the purpose of the franchise and of determining citizenship and of the referendum proposed after ten years, they will define residence as meaning residence on 29th November 1947 or subsequent residence for a substantial period. They will also provide for register of residents.

4. As regards official languages, working committee realised difficulty which would arise if only Arabic and Hebrew were proposed and Governor and senior members of staff did not speak these languages. In view of discussions in United Nations, however, they feel it would be impossible to propose English as a third official language. They will, however, propose that English and French should be working languages, without defining precisely the word "working".

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 282.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for
repetition to Jerusalem]

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Reference:-

371/61893

371 / 61893

OUT FILE

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(For United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4436

D. 7.32 p.m. 30th December, 1947

30th December, 1947

IMMEDIATE

Gibson is returning to New York, for work on the Jerusalem statute, by BOAC flight No. 13A 257, leaving London on the 2nd January.

2. Please arrange accommodation, if possible at the Roosevelt, and arrange for him to be met on arrival.

PPP

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371 / 61893

462.

1947

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PALESTINE

83

12233

24 DEC

Registry
Number

E12233/951/31.

FROM Iraqi Foreign
Minister

No. (conversations)

Dated 19 Dec.

Received
in Registry 24 Dec.Partition of Palestine.

Record of conversation between
Secretary of State & De Janili
at which De Janili gave his
views on U.N. decision to partition
Palestine.

(Minutes.)

* Last Paper.

E 12227

References.

(Print.)

H. C. D.

(How disposed of.)

for) Bagdad 4" ✓
Dec 23.

(Action
completed.)

LCB/2/1

(Index.)

4/12/48

Next Paper.

12248

29470 F.O.P.

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371/61893

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Despatch Section.

Reference:-

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PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN

December 23, 1947

Section 1

ARCHIVES

E 12233/951/31

Copy No. 8

CONVERSATION WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

Palestine

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Busk (Bagdad)

(No. 411)

Foreign Office,

23rd December, 1947

Sir,

I received the Iraqi Foreign Minister on 19th December. He had just arrived in London from New York on his way back to Bagdad.

2. Dr. Jamali began by speaking in terms of intense indignation of the decision by the Assembly on the partition of Palestine. He wished to recall that when I had informed him earlier in the year of the decision to refer the question of Palestine to the United Nations he had expressed his grave misgivings of the impartiality of that institution. He now felt that his worst fears had been justified. The representatives of the Arab countries had witnessed the spectacle of an international body which was supposed to base its decisions on justice being swayed by partisan feeling and political combinations. He blamed the United States Government, which at the last moment had, he maintained, blatantly influenced the votes of otherwise reluctant States in favour of partition.

3. I told Dr. Jamali that when I saw Nuri Pasha on 11th December he had said that he hoped that His Majesty's Government would lay down the mandate and complete their withdrawal from Palestine at the earliest possible moment; it was only when the Jews and the Arabs were left to confront each other directly that any solution could now be reached. Nuri Pasha felt that conciliation at some stage was now the only way out. I told Dr. Jamali that His Majesty's Government were prepared at any time to persist in the process of conciliation if they could helpfully do so. I regretted that during the last discussions with His Majesty's Government in London the Arabs had, like the Jews, refused to accept any of the compromise proposals which His Majesty's Government had put before both parties. I knew full well how difficult the Jews were to deal with, and it was the intervention of the New York Zionists which had wrecked any chances of final agreement at that time.

But the Arabs had not been willing to make a sufficient advance either.

4. I reminded Dr. Jamali that I had made it clear in my statement in the House of Commons on 12th December that His Majesty's Government would not hand over to the United Nations Commission until the termination of the mandate and had stated that His Majesty's Government would not make a port available to the Jews for immigration before that date. He expressed his appreciation.

5. Dr. Jamali went on, however, to say that in his view there was no legal basis for the decision of the Assembly and the United Nations Commission had no legal right to take over responsibility in Palestine. It followed that His Majesty's Government had no right to hand over authority to them. The United Nations only had the right to adopt one of two courses, either to declare Palestine independent or to place it under trusteeship. I reminded him that I had at an earlier stage proposed trusteeship to both Jews and Arabs, but neither had accepted. I did not pursue further the question of the legality of the decision of the Assembly.

6. Dr. Jamali emphasised that the Arab countries were looking to His Majesty's Government to help them and to give them guidance.

7. I repeated that His Majesty's Government were prepared to assist in attempts to reach a solution by conciliation if that should prove at any stage possible. I went on to say that once we were quit of the embarrassing commitments of the mandate, which might have led us into increasing friction with Middle East countries, our hands would be freer to pursue a policy towards the Middle East as a whole.

8. As he was leaving Dr. Jamali raised the question of the future of Libya. I told him that we were bearing fully in mind the interest of Arab countries in this question.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

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FO 371/61893					

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24 DEC 1947
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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 371/61893

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1947

PALESTINE

26 EC

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E12248/95/11

Lebanon

Minister

Lebanon

23 Dec

26

Not for circulation.
 Record of conversation between Sir P and Lebanese
 Minister, at which Sir P. spoke with
 bitterness at the way the Palestine question had been
 handled by the General Assembly. And of the
 way in which the US had brought pressure to
 bear on certain delegations.

Last Paper.

122 ~~33~~ 33

References.

(Print.)

K. C. D.

(How disposed of.)

Oft. Beirut

NO 252

✓ Dec. 24

(Action
completed.)

J. E. H. 2/1

(Index)

J. E. H. 2/1

Next Paper

12260

29470 F.O.P.

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371/61893

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90
.....Division
Palatine 24 Dec 41
A copy has been sent
to The King.
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Despatch Section.

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371/61893

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Circulated to the Cabinet by direction of
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN
December 24, 1947
Section 1

E 12248/951/31

ARCHIVES

Copy No. 8

CONVERSATION WITH THE LEBANESE MINISTER

Palestine

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Beirut)

(No. 252) Foreign Office,
Sir, 24th December, 1947

The Lebanese Minister called on me yesterday to make his first official visit after presenting his letters. This had been delayed owing to his absence for the last few months at the General Assembly and on a tour of South America.

2. Dr. Khouri had no special communication to make to me, but he spoke at some length about the Palestine question and the great disillusionment of the Arab States at the way in which this question had been handled by the General Assembly, and more particularly by the United States, against whom there was a very real bitterness among the Arab delegation and the Arab peoples. Dr. Khouri quoted in particular instances of which he claimed to have first-hand information in which certain of the delegations, e.g., the Filipino and Haiti delegations, had been compelled by the United States Administration under

the strongest pressure to modify their views and vote with the United States delegation.

3. Dr. Khouri felt convinced that only the Soviet Union could profit from recent developments in Palestine and from the decision of the General Assembly. He spoke of Communist influence among Zionists in Palestine and said that he and his Government were most anxious that British relations with the Arab States should not be embittered as a result of the Palestine dispute.

4. I informed Dr. Khouri that we hoped to have an opportunity in the coming weeks to discuss the whole position with our various Arab friends and impressed upon him the importance in the meanwhile, in the Arab interest as much as in the general interest, of the Arab Governments using all their influence to avoid fanning the flames of strife and unrest in Palestine.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

1	2	3	4	5	6
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Reference:-

FO 371/61893

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Regulation. 92
F

24th December, 1947.

Sin,

The Lebanese Minister called on me yesterday to make his first official visit after presenting his letters. This had been delayed owing to his absence for the last few months at the General Assembly and on a tour of South America.

2. Dr. Khouri had no special communication to make to me, but he spoke at some length about the Palestine question and the great disillusionment of the Arab States at the way in which this question had been handled by the General Assembly, and more particularly by the U.S., against whom there was a very real bitterness among the Arab Delegation and the Arab peoples. Dr. Khouri quoted in particular instances of which he claimed to have first-hand information in which certain of the delegations, e.g./^{the}Filipino and Haiti Delegations, had been compelled by the U.S. Administration under ^{strong}U.S. strongest pressure to modify their views and vote with the U.S. Delegation.

3. Dr. Khouri felt convinced that only the Soviet Union could profit from recent developments in Palestine and from the decision of the General Assembly. He spoke of communist influence among Zionists in Palestine and said that he and his Government were most anxious that British relations with the Arab States should not be embittered as a result of the Palestine dispute.

4. I informed Dr. Khouri that we hoped to have/

Draft.

H.M. Minister,
BEIRUT

No. 252

Print: K C D

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371/61893

[Handwritten signature]

(Sed.) L. F. L. Pyman.

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Reference:-

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1941

E

PALESTINE

12260

27 DEC

94

Registry Number } E12260/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir R. Campbell
No. CAIRO.
180 Saving.

Dated } 24.12.47.
Received in Registry } 27.12.47.

Egyptian attitude to the Palestine problem
Records interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 23rd at which he was asked if he could see any solution to the Palestine problem.
Refers to Cairo tel. no 2278(E11613/11280/65).

Last Paper.

E 12248

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) Mr. Mathieson, C.O.
Ch. Evershed, Lab. Off.
G/C Stapleton, M/D.
N.1.3a. W.O.
N.O.4.
Adty.
A.M. Dec. 30

(Action completed.)

J.P. 30/12

(Index.)

1/1/46

Next Paper.

E 12276

30471 F.O.P

mp - UN (P.N.) (Minutes) 24.12.
Please give normal Palestine distribution.

H.B. 29/12

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

En Clair [by confidential bag] DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)
DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell

No. 180 SAVING

24th December, 1947. R. 26th December, 1947 DEC

TOP SECRET

Your telegram No. 2270.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 23rd whether he saw any solution to the Palestine problem.

His Excellency reminded me of his recent remark to me that he believed Arabs would still accept something on lines of Morrison plan or their own last proposal at U.N. Assembly (see my telegram No. 2278 paragraph 2). He said that he still hoped a solution on these lines might be possible. He thought the Jews were piping down a bit having found against all their expectations that Arabs meant business and were united and that therefore they might in the end come to agree such a solution. Grand Rabbi of Egypt who was a friend of his was exerting influence on Egyptian Jews in favour of compromise which he believed would be in interest of Middle East Jews. Grand Rabbi was in touch with Dr. Magnes who shared his point of view, and there might be a meeting between them. His Excellency thought influence of these two men might have fairly wide effect abroad.

3. I took opportunity to put into Minister for Foreign Affairs' head that his idea involved conciliation at some stage, which seemed best solution, and that it was important that no rash action and clashes should take place which would make eventual development he hoped for impossible. His Excellency, while not dissenting, said that it was strong attitude of Arabs that was making it possible to hope for helpful evolution of Jewish state of mind.

4. Khashaba Pasha interprets action of United States in preventing discussion of partition decision in Security Council as actuated by desire to avoid or at least postpone a decision

(a) calling for use of American troops for enforcement,

(b) opening door to direct Russian intervention in Palestine.

This seemed to show hesitation on the part of United States to insist on enforcement and desire to give time for some agreed solution, and gave him a certain amount of hope.

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12276

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1947

PALESTINE

29

Registry
Number

E12276/957/31

FROM

A. Ammanagi

No.

Lynnan Legation

Dated

4th Dec

Received
in Registry

25 Dec

29 -

Use of Force to Partition PalestineLynnan Legation hopes that the voice of Britain
will be heard against the use of force in the
execution of the Partition Plan.

Last Paper.

12260

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

ack.

Dec 31

(Action
completed.)

28/5/47

(Index.)

29/5/47

Next Paper.

12279

(Minutes.)

Draft submitted

NOT sent. See minute at E12286/957/31

1/1947

D.A.
3/5/48

H. Bealey

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(33654) WL14896/147 75,000 6/47 A. & E. W. Ltd. Gp. 685

Registry
No. E 12276/951/31

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

The Syrian
Minister.

(From: Mr. Mayhew)

*Copy comm
Damascus
Cairo
Bagdad
Teldda
Beirut
Amman
Washington
✓ UK Id HB 1/1
NYork*

*C.O.
My of Defence*

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

January, 1948

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 23rd December, in which you express the hope of the Syrian Government that H.M.G. in the United Kingdom will oppose the use of force in the execution of the Resolution concerning Palestine which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 29th November, 1947.

You will have seen the statement made by Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons on the 12th December, to the effect that H.M.G. will not themselves take part in any collective action to impose the decision of the General Assembly by force.

At the same time H.M.G. have stated that as a loyal member of the United Nations they will not obstruct the execution of the decision taken by the Assembly.

Within the scope of the two principles summarised above, the attitude to be adopted by H.M.G. towards any proposals which may be made at a later date for collective action designed to enforce the Resolution of the 29th November must depend upon the exact nature of the proposals and the circumstances in which they are made.

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whole of Asia. These difficulties would be all the more embarrassing since the use of force would be a denial in principle of both the spirit and terms of the Charter, which provides among other things for "the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace", and for the development of "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples", in addition to being in practice and contrary of justice and lasting peace which the United Nations was set up to establish.

I may add that this matter has been the subject of conversations between the Syrian Government and His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Damascus.

I have the honour, Sir, to be,

Your obedient Servant.

K. Armanazi

Minister.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin. M.P.

The Foreign Office,

Whitehall.

S.W.1.

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.,

23rd December, 1947.

E12279/951/31
SECRET

29 DEC

In the course of conversation at the Foreign Office yesterday, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs urged that arms should be issued by the Palestine Government to Arab inhabitants to defend themselves against attacks by Jewish organisations such as that which recently took place and resulted in fifteen deaths. Dr. Jamali reverted to the suggestion which he said was made in the course of the last Palestine Conference here that either all inhabitants of Palestine should be disarmed, or arms should be issued for Arab village guards, in the same way as arms had previously been issued to Jewish settlement guards.

I see from paragraphs 3 and 4 of Jerusalem telegram No. 2476 that some developments of this kind are under consideration in Palestine, but these seem to be confined to the towns and larger villages. Dr. Jamali was thinking particularly of small villages.

Could you let us know as soon as possible what reply you suggest we should give to Dr. Jamali on this point? He may only be staying a few days longer and we should like to give him an answer before he leaves.

Trafford Smith, Esq.,
Colonial Office.

(Signed) B.A.B. Burrows.

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105

H. Beeley 20/12

22.12

Seen by Mr Wright
Feb sent

23.1 ✓

RECEIVED IN C.B.

26 DEC 1947

3747 TO DEPT.

20 DEC 70

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Draft.

Telegram *V.K. Del.*

No. *New York*

(Date) *4388*

Repeat to: *Sec 23*

Washington
No *13263*

~~Fin Chair~~
Code.
Cypher.

Distribution:-

Dept. of State 2

Copies to:-

*Palestine
distribution*

CYPLIER

F.O.

OUT FILE

Despatched

M.

Secret

Addressed to V.K. Delegation, New

York, telegram no *4388* of *23/12*
for inform
repeated to Washington

I was told by Marshall that

Hilldring will be dealing with the
Palestine question during *HERSCHEL*
Herschel

Johnson's illness. Marshall states

that he has a great deal of
confidence in Hilldring, with whom
*I hope you will maintain close
contact.*

WAB

23.12

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349 Wt. 26469/137 100m 9146 (51) F.&S.

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December, 1947.

29 EC

Yours sincerely,

Sgd

B. R. Carson

J. M. Martin, Esq., C.B., C.V.O.,
Colonial Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

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With the Compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations.

Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office

23 DEC 1947

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

R.D.

110

FROM : INDIA (GOVT)

D. New Delhi 1.35.a.m. 21st December, 1947

R. 10.55.p.m. 20th December, 1947

No.10710

Your telegram 14539 dated December 7th. Palestine.

2. We agree generally with His Majesty's Government in decisions reached but do not know in what way we can support them.
3. As regards paragraph No.8 we assume that it will not be possible to maintain control over immigration after February 1st owing to evacuation of troops. His Majesty's Government have doubtless taken fact that large scale Jewish immigration during period of transition may intensify Jewish-Arab conflict and thus add to difficulty of authorities responsible for maintenance of law and order.
4. We should like to be informed if possible of nature of "less essential stores" which His Majesty's Government think will have to be left behind.

Copy to :

Foreign Office	Mr.I.A.Kirkpatrick
	Mr.J.P.G.Finch (4)
	Mr.B.A.B.Burrows
Colonial Office	Mr. Trafford Smith

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The Church House,
Great Smith Street,
London, S.W. 1.

January 2, 1948.

We assume that the War Office will be providing you with the material required to answer paragraph 4 of the telegram. With regard to paragraph 3, we suggest comment as follows:

The Foreign Office are in agreement with the lines of this comment.

(Tratford Smith)

B.R. CURSON, Esq.

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371/61893

p. 112

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

EXTERNAL DEPARTMENT
Ext. 5102/48

CYPHER (TYPEX)

R.D.

TO: INDIA (GOVT.)

(Sent 11.35 p.m. 13th Jan., 1948)

No. 92

Your telegram dated 21st December No. 10710, Palestine.

2. Your para 2. We should be grateful for anything that the Government of India representative at U.N.O. may be able to do in explaining the U.K. point of view after consultation with Sir A. Cadogan. Main object is to complete withdrawal of our troops as reapidly and smoothly as possible and at the same time to avoid friction with U.N. Commission or United Nations as a whole.
3. Your para 3. We are well aware that large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine during the period of transition may well intensify Jewish-Arab conflict and thus add to difficulty of maintaining law and order. So long as we are responsible for Mandate for Palestine, we shall use our best endeavours to maintain control over immigration into the country.
4. Your para 4. Stores in question consist mainly of unserviceable Engineer and barrack stores, containers, and other material and some unserviceable vehicles. Ammunition will be demolished.

Copy to:

Mr. Burrows F.O. (Eastern)
Lt. Col. the Hon. M. Charteres O.B.E. W.O.
Mr. W.A.D. Mathieson C.O.
H.C. for India.

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1947

PALESTINE

12282

29 EC

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E12282/751/31

70 Minute

M. A. N. H. C.

Dec 10.

2900

Political Situation.

During negotiations with Abdol Majid Abbas
Katter stated that Arab Govt would not take
any action that would bring them into conflict with
HMG over Palestine. He also thought that HMG
should make a statement to effect that they had
fulfilled the terms of the Mandate and that Balfour
Declaration and had established a Jewish
National Home.

Last Paper.

12281

References.

(Minutes.)

See within

H73. 29/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

T. C. H. 30/12

(Index.)

21/1/48

Next Paper.

12286

29470 F.O.P.

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E12282

29 50

I had lunch today with a member of the Iraqi delegation to UNO (now in London with Nuri Pasha) named Dr Abdul Mejid Abbas.

Inevitably we had to discuss Palestine.

Dr said little except that Hach were determined to keep order until they left and would be compelled to take steps against either side if they started ~~with~~ hostilities. Dr Abbas said he felt sure that the Iraqi Govt would not take any action that would bring them as a government into conflict with Hach.

Dr Abbas then said that he thought it would be of great help in calming opinion in the Arab world if Hach would announce unequivocally that they considered the Balfour Declaration to have been fulfilled.

He said we had announced that we felt we had done everything possible to establish the Jewish national home, but he ~~felt~~ ^{thought} that a further statement saying that Hach had fulfilled the terms of the mandate and the Balfour Declaration and had established a national home for the Jews in Palestine would be worth making. It would ^{show}

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show that the Jews no longer had any justification for basing their demand for a Jewish state on the Balfour Declaration: they would have to rely on UNO or something similar.

Dr Abbas also told me that Dr Tammali, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, leaves New York for the U.K. on the Queen Mary today. He should arrive in London on Dec 15th.

Mr Walker

(Mr WALKER) 17/12

It may be advisable to detain Dr Tammali here.

L.H. Pyman

11/12

Mr Bealey for my obs


The Colonial Secretary, in his speech of the 16th October at Lake Success, said that "the National Home has been established". This was afterwards interpreted by Arab Delegates as implying that our obligations under the Balfour Declaration to have been fully discharged. We did not dispute this interpretation.

It might be useful to make a similar statement again if the occasion presents itself.

H Bealey 13/12

We will bear this in mind.

13/12



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12286

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29 EC

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number E12286/951/31

FROM

40 Minute

No.

101 Bureau.

Dated

23 DEC.

Received in Registry

29

Politics, 11 M. J. Vickers

Transmits record of conversation between Mr. Fitzmaurice and Sirgi Miller for Foreign Affairs, who asked for a clear statement of 11 M. J. Vickers on several questions relating to Palestine. Advice is being obtained before reply is made.

Last Paper.

12282

(Minutes.)

Please see minutes within.

References.

On no. 1 of Dr. Jammali's questions, Mr. Fitzmaurice's opinion coincides with the line taken by the U.K. Delegation in New York, where we said that we were not transferring the mandate but terminating it. In so doing we would take account of arrangements made by the United Nations to supervise the establishment of a new regime following our departure. The question whether those arrangements were legally justifiable or not was not one on which we felt called upon to express an opinion.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Off. Lifford Smith.
B.U.
from 101 Bureau.
23 Dec

(Action completed.)

J. P. 4/5

(Index)

12282
12283

Next Paper.

(443/4131)

E 12350

29470 F.O.P.

This interpretation of the transition might be repeated to Dr. Jammali. It does not answer his question, however, and I think we might add Mr. Fitzmaurice's further point that a reference to the best would now be too late to make any practical difference to events in Palestine.

The answer to question no. 2 seems to be that a fortnight is the minimum period we could suggest without departing from our understanding

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H. Beeley 29/12

X A.B.

$$3/5/48$$

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29 EC

(Signed) B. A. B. Burrows.

Trafford Smith, Esq.,
Colonial Office.

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U.N. (Pol.) Dept.

Mr. Beckett.

Please see below record of conversation with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs about Palestine. Mr. Wright would be very glad to have answers to these questions which could be given to Dr. Jamali before he leaves, which may be in a few days' time.

A copy of the record has been sent to the Colonial Office, with a request that they will let us have their views also.

I attach the entered copy of the Damascus telegram referred to, which I suggest might be considered at the same time.

B.H.B. Brown

23rd December, 1947.

I think U.N. Dept. are only concerned with (1) and (3) and I have dealt with (3) very briefly on the entered paper. As regards (1), I do not know who has supported the Arabs in their belief that the Assembly is not the right body to which to surrender the mandate, but we are surely quite confident that the Assembly (which is, after all, the forum of the U.N. as a whole) is the right body: and I do not see how you could surrender the mandate to the Trusteeship Council, since (a) there is no agreement as to the

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Court/

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he can't

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7-0 371/61893

Minutes.

Court regarding the legality of the arrangements made by the General Assembly would not materially alter the situation.

The second point raises in a somewhat different form the same point made in the telegram in E12090, as to which please see my minute on that paper. The answer is, I think, essentially the same. What we said was that we would not impose partition by force or participate in any arrangements for that purpose. On the other hand we have said that we would not obstruct the carrying out of the Assembly's resolution, and the period of a fortnight amounts to no more than an orderly method of leaving the country, winding up our own administration and handing over to the body appointed by the General Assembly to carry on.

The third question raises issues which are mainly of policy, and it is certainly a question of policy whether we should answer this question at all. I think we must be careful not to give the Arabs the impression that we would approve of any such action. I think again the matter is one which is governed by our declarations that we would not ourselves participate in the use of force, but would equally not obstruct the action of the United Nations. In the events contemplated by the third question the matter would presumably come before the Security Council, and I should have thought our line there would be that we would not obstruct any action which the remainder of the Security Council thought it necessary to take in order to preserve peace and security, or to enforce the resolutions of the General Assembly; but that, on the other hand, we would not ourselves participate actively in the use of force. We should in fact not use our veto and our probable course would be abstention. As I say, however, these are really matters of policy and it is very difficult to determine what our course would be until the situation actually arose.

G. G. Fitzmaurice
(G.G. Fitzmaurice)
29th December, 1947.

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In the course of a conversation with Mr. Wright yesterday, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is here for a few days on his way back to Iraq from New York, asked for a clear statement of our views on several questions relating to Palestine.

(1) The Arab Delegations in New York had obtained considerable support for the view that the Assembly was not competent to decide the future of Palestine and that we could not legally hand over our responsibilities to the United Nations Commission set up by the Assembly. In their view we could only hand over to the inhabitants of Palestine or under a trusteeship agreement. The question on which the Arabs would now like guidance was whether there would be advantage in their bringing a case before the International Court, either against H.M. Government in the United Kingdom for wrongfully handing over their responsibilities in Palestine or against the Commission for wrongfully undertaking these responsibilities. (He was aware that only three members of the Commission had subscribed to the International Court - Denmark, the Philippines and Panama).

(2) Could we not do without the period of a fortnight in which we proposed to hand over to the United Nations Commission? This hand-over would be regarded by the Arabs as amounting to at least partial implementation of partition, which we have always said we are unwilling to do.

(3) What would be the attitude of H.M. Government if the Arab States sent their armies into Palestine on the termination of the mandate? The assumption would be that the armies would occupy the whole of Palestine, but without molesting the Jews, and would remain there until a constitutional Government had been formed.

[This appears to tie up with the enquiry made by the Syrian President to H.M. Minister at Damascus, as report in Damascus telegram No. 568 of December 18th, as to the attitude of H.M. Government in the Security Council if the question of enforcement of the Assembly recommendations should be discussed there, and I suggest that the two questions might be considered together].

Mr. Wright said we would obtain legal advice and see what answers we could give to Dr. Jamali on these points before he left.

Barbara

23rd December, 1947.

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371/61893

There are several related questions on Palestine on which decisions and action are required. These are:-

(1) British action in the Security Council raised by the Syrian Government in the Note in E 12276/951/31 (Flag A) and in Damascus telegram No. 568 in E 12090/11283/89 (Flag B).

(2) The somewhat similar enquiry by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs in E 12286/951/31 (Flag C) as to the attitude of H.M. Government if the Arab States send their armies into Palestine.

(3) Dr. Jamali's question in the same paper whether we could shorten the period of hand-over.

(4) Dr. Jamali's enquiry in the same paper about our view of the legal position as regards the powers of the Assembly and the termination of H.M. Government's responsibility.

(5) The earlier Note from the Syrian Legation in E 11676/951/31 (Flag D), asking for assurances that we shall not allow British forces to be used in support of Zionism before we withdraw.

On the first question, there are minutes on E 12090 (Flag B), the conclusion of which is that it would be quite wrong for us to use our veto in the Security Council to prevent action in Palestine which would otherwise command the necessary majority. It is impossible to foresee exactly the circumstances in which the question might go to the Security Council. It might be as a result of direct action by the Arab States to upset the partition decision, or it might be a general state of chaos arising from disturbances by Arab irregulars and making it impossible to implement the partition proposals.

Our reply to the enquiry should begin by repeating the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons on 12th December that we will not take part in action by military forces under the Security Council and should then make clear that, while very sympathetic with the Arabs, we are also loyal members of the United Nations and cannot commit ourselves in advance to adopt any particular line in any further discussions which the United Nations may have, particularly in view of the impossibility of forecasting what way the question might be taken to the Security Council. A draft on these lines is attached to the relevant paper, also a draft telegram to Damascus on the same lines.

As/

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As regards (2) above, the answer to be given to Dr. Jamali would be on very much the same lines, i.e. general sympathy with the Arabs, our United Nations obligations and our hope that the Arabs would not take action which would make an ultimate permanent settlement more difficult to attain.

As regards (3) above, we could tell Dr. Jamali that we have not yet begun discussing with the United Nations Commission. We mentioned a fortnight as being the absolute minimum time in which the hand-over could take place and we shall certainly be pressed to make the period longer. If we were handing over in the normal way and taking administrative considerations into account, the period would be very much longer. In our discussions with the Commission we will certainly bear in mind the danger of attempting to associate ourselves too closely with the implementation of partition during the hand-over period.

On (4) we can reply as suggested by Mr. Fitzmaurice on E 12286/951/31, i.e. we are not transferring the mandate but terminating it. The United Nations have made arrangements for a successor authority, but we are not called upon to comment on the legality of these arrangements. There are certainly a number of legal points, but we could not advise the Arabs whether to take any or all of them to the International Court. We would, however point out that, even if they did so, this would not influence our decision to withdraw and our withdrawal would be complete long before the Court gave any ruling. In fact, we do not feel that there is a case against us, but if the Arabs wish to bring a case against anyone else, we should certainly not want to obstruct them. They should, however, be clear that this will not affect the immediate future, however much it might affect the legality of what followed our withdrawal.

On (5) above, a draft reply to the Syrian Note of December 6th is attached to E 11676.

We ought to obtain C.O. concurrence.

RAB

2nd January, 1948.

I have held up these papers for a few days since a paper is now before the Secretary of State making certain suggestions as to the line we might take with the Iraqis when they raise the question of Palestine. These suggestions go somewhat further than is proposed above. The Secretary of State is considering them and will probably discuss them with the Colonial Secretary before he sees the Iraqis. I see no particular advantage in our being in a hurry to answer any of these enquiries, and I suggest we should await the Secretary of State's decisions on the paper now before him.

Mr. Wright

10th January, 1947.

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Reference:-

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Please see

X OAB 1.5

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126

1947

PALESTINE

30 DEC

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

Last Paper.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

*Re: 11th & 12th**...two points connected with 11th & 12th
...in 1947. ... of U.N. ...
... of ...*

(Minutes.)

Paras. 2 and 3 within I think it is possible to "accept" a decision without "endorsing" it. Our position is that we cannot express any approval of the decision regarding **Palestine** which the United Nations have taken, and that we will not participate in any active way in ~~commenting~~ it. At the same time, we have undertaken to respect the decision of a good member of the United Nations, in the sense that we shall do nothing to obstruct its execution. This seems to me a reasonably logical position.

Para. 4. Mr. Falla suggests that any action which the Security Council might direct in accordance with the Assembly Resolution might call for the use of U.K. Forces. The Resolution itself, however, requests the Security Council in certain circumstances to take measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter. Article 41 relates not to ~~Military~~ Enforcement but to "Measures not involving the use of ~~A~~med Forces".

I do not wish to suggest, by drawing this distinction, that we should co-operate positively in non-military action under Article 41. The words used by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on the 12th December were that "we cannot ourselves undertake, either individually or collectively in association with others, to impose that decision by force". Action under Article 41, equally with action under Article 42, would presumably be taken with the object of imposing the decision of the Assembly. The discrepancy to which Mr. Falla draws attention (last sentence of para. 5 within) is between ~~his~~ statement of the attitude of His Majesty's Government to a specific plan adopted by the Assembly and an earlier statement of the standards which His Majesty's Government would apply to any decision the Assembly might subsequently take. Surely, the implication of the Secretary of State's speech is that, having applied those standards to the resolution of the 29th November, they find that they cannot participate with others in its enforcement. In other words, they are not satisfied ~~at~~ either (a) that the settlement is inherently just, or (b) that it can be put into effect without an excessive use of force, or (c) that it is ^{not} open to both ~~these~~ objections.

U.N. Political Dept.
29470 F.O.R.

(H. BEELEY)

31st December, 1947.

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12353

I do not know whether this is a hare which it is in all the circumstances merely an academical exercise to assume; but if not it does seem to provide rather an awkward dilemma and, as I agree with Mr. Falla in thinking that the exercise of our right of veto in such circumstances would be a most serious step (which I personally hope that we should never take) I do not know that we could escape from it otherwise than by pointing to the highly invidious position in which we, as the outgoing mandatory power would be placed if we were asked ourselves to contribute to enforcement measures. This is an admittedly weak retort, but I think that the Delegation are right in drawing our attention to the position and I should personally be grateful to have the Legal Adviser's view on this issue.

T. Hasan

Mr Beckett.

I agree with Mr. Mason that we want
have to take action under Art. 41 provided
it is, to speak, in relation to an
independent treaty to a breach of the
peace & not for the specific purpose
of enforcing the Assembly Resolution. It seems
to me however that ^{in practice} there would always be a
tie up with the latter which would afford a detour.
8/3/12

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Reference:-

371/61893

Minutes.

123

I submit a draft.

H. Beeby 2/11

Barbara

7.0

MTL

8.1

Encl. Extract letter from W. Balchurst, New York.
Jan. 8.

HB. 19/

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference:-

F-0

371/61893



UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

TELEPHONE:
LONGACRE 5-2070

Nº 52/623/47

REPLIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
P. O. Box 304
NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

12350

23rd December, 1947.

30 DEC

Dear Paul,

There are two points in connection with our policy in regard to Palestine about which we are not quite clear and on which I should be grateful for some enlightenment.

2. The first point is perhaps primarily one for Eastern Department, and I am sending Bernard Burrows a copy of this letter. F.O. telegram to the Middle East Office in Cairo No. 888 of December 13th says "It is important to preserve our impartial position and to avoid any appearance of endorsing (any more than opposing) the U.N. decision". On the other hand, the Colonial Secretary said in Parliament on December 11th (Hansard, column 1218) that we would "loyally accept" the Assembly decision in so far as it did not conflict with the conditions announced by the United Kingdom Delegation to the Assembly; and our own Secretary of State expressed himself on the following day (Hansard, column 1405) as follows:-

"On the other hand, there is the United Nations decision. There it is, no-one intending to challenge it, no-one intending to turn back on that judgment. There that decision is of that world organism, whether we agree with it or not. It is on the statute book of that great Organisation. May it be possible to implement it."

3. One possible interpretation of this apparent discrepancy is that the telegram to Cairo referred, so to speak, to H.M.G.'s private approval or disapproval of the United Nations policy, as opposed to their intention as members of the United Nations to co-operate with that policy now that it has been adopted, - and as is required, e.g., by the last sentence of paragraph 12 on page 5 of A/516, which lays down that "the Mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions". It may be, however, that this interpretation is not the right one, and we should be glad to know your views on the correct formulation of H.M.G.'s attitude as a member of the United Nations towards the Assembly resolution.

Paul Mason, Esq.,
United Nations (Political) Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

4. The

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30 DEC 1947

SENT TO DEPT.
30 DEC 1947

130

4. The second point is, in a sense, a practical application of the first. As you know, the Security Council is requested contingently, in one of the opening paragraphs of the Assembly resolution, to take action under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, during the period between the adoption of the Assembly resolution and the establishment of the Arab and Jewish States, in order to enable the United Nations Commission to carry out its functions. There have already been hints from the Jewish Agency in New York and Jerusalem that the Security Council may soon be asked to intervene in Palestine in view of the threat to international peace and security arising from the present disorders. Any action which the Security Council might direct with a view to removing such a threat to the peace (and indirectly implementing the United Nations' recommendations on the future of Palestine) might presumably, under Article 48 of the Charter, call for the use of United Kingdom forces among others. We note, however, from Hansard of December 12th, columns 1402 and 1403, that the Secretary of State has said, in effect, that, until the Article 43 agreements have been concluded, U.K. forces will in no circumstances be made available to the Security Council for collective action directed by the Council.

10471/9-11/V

5. We presume, after consultation with Maurice Bathurst and in the light of F.O. telegram to us No.3874 of November 12th, that the justification of this standpoint is that Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter (and Article 25 in relation to these Articles) are inoperative until the Article 43 agreements have been concluded, and that the only interim enforcement machinery envisaged by the Charter which we would recognise is that provided for in Article 106 - as to which we understand Beckett's view to be (see para.6 of I.O.C.(N.Y.)(47) II (81)) that it constitutes merely an "agreement to agree" and not a definitive obligation. At the same time, there seems to be some discrepancy between the statement that "we cannot ourselves undertake, either individually or collectively with others, to impose that decision by force", and the more qualified position which H.M.G. took up from the outset of the Assembly discussions on Palestine, that "in considering any proposal to the effect that H.M.G. should participate with others in the enforcement of a settlement, they must take into account both the inherent justice of the settlement and the extent to which force would be required to give effect to it" (our telegram No.2639 of September 25th, paragraph 9).

6. We should be very grateful for any explanation that you can let us have on either of the above points. As regards the second, the knot could, of course, always be cut, in the last resort, by a United Kingdom veto on any decision by the Council inconsistent with H.M.G.'s attitude as

defined

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- 2 -

defined by the Foreign Secretary. But we assume that in all the circumstances, H.M.G. would not wish to exercise their veto in regard to Palestine unless it were absolutely necessary.

7. I have sent a copy of this letter to Denis Allen in Washington.

Yours ever,

Paul
(P.S. Falla)

(P.S. Falla)

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11th Jan

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Open~~

Confidential

Dear Paul,

We have examined the questions raised by your letter no 52/623/47 of the 23rd December, on the subject of Palestine, and I hope the following comments will help to clarify the position.

2. I do not think there is necessarily any inconsistency between "loyally accepting" a decision and refusing to "endorse" it. ~~The position~~ of H.M. Government ~~is that, since they~~ are not prepared either to endorse ~~or to condemn~~ or to condemn it ~~considered the decision to have been~~ (except on the one ground that it is not ~~unwise, they cannot express approval of~~ enforceable). ~~it~~ [At the same time they have undertaken, as a good member of the United Nations, to respect it in the negative sense that they will do nothing to obstruct

Draft. letter to
P.S.
Mr. Falla
(UK Del. New York)

P.
(from Mr. Mason)

2.5.61
Mr. Mason

No. We cannot
on principle
X
unacceptable

H. Beeley 21,

M. F. G. 21

H. Beeley 21

11.1.51

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(2/47) (14728) Wt. 11489-144 250m 5/47 G.S.St.

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Reference:-

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371/61893

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obstruct its execution.

3. I should add that this decision ~~resolution~~ not to obstruct the execution of the will of the General Assembly does not by any means imply that H.M. Government consider themselves bound to afford positive assistance to the United Nations Commission to the full extent provided for by the Assembly's recommendations (Document A/516). Indeed, the U.K. Delegation at the Assembly stated explicitly that their Government would not consider itself bound by the detailed provisions of this document. And the Secretary of State has since made it clear, in his speech of the 12th December in the House of Commons, that it will not be possible to carry out at least one of these provisions, namely

/ that

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Open.

Draft.

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(2/47) (14728) Wt. 11489-144 250m 5/47 G.S.St.

134
that for the transfer of authority over
a report in the Jewish area on the
1st February.

4. If I correctly understand your
second point, it is in substance that
at some stage the Security Council might
be asked to receive, not a complaint that
enforcement of
the Assembly resolution was being obstructed,
but a complaint of direct aggression by
Arab against Jew (or vice versa) which,
if it could not be disposed of by
peaceful procedures, might be brought to
the Security Council's attention under
Chapter VII of the Charter. In that event
it might be difficult for H.M. Government
to avoid the implications of Article 48
(which I am disposed to think ~~may~~
might be interpreted as applying to
measures adopted by virtue of Article 41
as well as to measures of military
enforcement).

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Reference:-

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enforcement). In practice, however, I think action on any ~~such~~ complaint ^{in Palestine} ~~would be so close to~~ ^{come near to being indistinguishable} from enforcement of the Assembly resolution as such, and in ^{such} that we should be able to plead our declared policy of taking no part in such enforcement.

5. The use of our veto ^{to prevent enforcement by others} is quite a different matter, and I agree with you that it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which H.M. Government would wish to take this drastic step.

6. With reference to the last sentence of your paragraph 5, the statement you quote from the Colonial Secretary's speech of the 26th September was a definition of the standards by which H.M. Government would judge any recommendation which might
/subsequently

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(2/47) (14728) Wt. 11489-144 250m 5/47 G.S.St.

136

subsequently be adopted by the
Assembly before they would agree to
participate in implementing it. The
other statement you quote in this
sentence is taken from the Secretary of
State's speech of the 12th December. It
relates, that is to say, to the specific
recommendation which was in fact
adopted by the Assembly; ~~and~~ it
implies that the recommendation has
been tested by the ~~test~~ standards laid
down on the 26th September, and
~~has been found wanting~~. That
participation has been found impossible
on account of "the extent to which force
would be required to give effect to it."

Yours ever

(Sgd.) Paul Mason.

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Reference:-

FO

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137

9th January, 1948.

(E 12350/951/31)
Confidential

Dear Paul,

We have examined the questions raised by your letter No. 52/623/47 of the 23rd December last on the subject of Palestine, and I hope the following comments will help to clarify the position.

2.. I do not think there is necessarily any inconsistency between "loosely accepting" a decision and refusing to "endorse" it. His Majesty's Government are not prepared either to endorse the decision, or to condemn it (except on the one ground that it is not enforceable). At the same time they have undertaken, as a good member of the United Nations, to respect it in the negative sense that they will do nothing to obstruct its execution.

3. I should add that this decision not to obstruct the execution of the will of the General Assembly does not by any means imply that His Majesty's Government consider themselves bound to offer positive assistance to the United Nations Commission to the full extent provided for by the Assembly's recommendations (document A/116). Indeed, the United Kingdom Delegation at the Assembly stated implicitly that their Government would not consider itself bound by the detailed provisions of this document. And the Secretary of State has since made it clear, in his speech of the 12th December last in the House of Commons, that it will not be possible to carry out at least one of these provisions, namely that for the transfer of authority over a seaport in the Jewish area on the 1st February.

4. If I correctly understand your second point, it is in substance that at some stage the Security Council might be asked to receive, not a complaint that enforcement of the Assembly resolution was being obstructed but a complaint of direct aggression by Arab against Jew or vice versa, which, if it could not be disposed of by peaceful procedures, might be brought to the Security Council's attention under Chapter VII of the Charter. In that event it might be difficult for His Majesty's Government to avoid the implications of Article 48 (which I am disposed to think might be interpreted as applying to measures adopted by virtue of Articles 41 as well as to measures of military enforcement). In practice, however, I think action on any complaint of aggression in Palestine would come near to being indistinguishable from enforcement of the Assembly resolution as such, and in that case we should be able to plead our declared policy of taking no part in such enforcement.

15.

P.S. Falls, Esq.,
United Kingdom Delegation
to the United Nations,
New York.

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5. The use of our veto to prevent enforcement by others is quite a different matter, and I agree with you that it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which His Majesty's Government would wish to take this drastic step.

6. With reference to the last sentence of your paragraph five, the statement you quote from the Colonial Secretary's speech of the 26th September last was a definition of the standards by which His Majesty's Government would judge any recommendation which might subsequently be adopted by the Assembly before they would agree to participate in implementing it. The other statement you quote in this sentence is taken from the Secretary of State's speech of the 12th December last. It relates, that is to say, to the specific recommendation which was in fact adopted by the Assembly; it implies that the recommendation has been tested by the standards laid down on the 26th September, and that participation has been found impossible on account of "the extent to which force would be required to give effect to it".

Yours ever

(Sect.) Paul Mason

(P. Mason)

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371/61893

139

WGB

2/19/1952

F.89/1/85

Dear Sir
 I am sorry about
 this in the
 enclosed copy
 of the letter.
 Yr. Svc.
 E. 1234 (1951)

S. E. A. Dept. ✓
PST

W.D.
14/1

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371/61893

472

E

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12353

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1947

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

E 12353/951/31

FROM

O. B. Anderson,

No.

Minneapolis.

Dated

Received
in Registry

Min

Nov 26

Dec 30

Political, American Policy.

Transmits copy of letter sent to Mr. Harold Johnson
criticizing him for his statement that U.S. had
confronted U.N. with an almost insuperable task
in the political question, gives his views on same.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

12350

N. American Dept.

H.B. 307
12

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

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J. B. 1/1

(Index.)

J. B. 1/1

Next Paper.

E 12375

29470 F.O.P.

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Reference:-

FO

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141

1122 Irving Ave. North,
Minneapolis, Minn.,
Nov. 26, 1947.

**Mr. Hershel V. Johnson,
United States Representative,
Lake Success, N.Y.**

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I see you recently criticized Great Britain for having confronted the United Nations General Assembly with an almost insuperable task, with regard to the Palestine problem. You added that the British representative had provided only "desultory" help in finding a solution.

I am an American by birth, of Scandinavian extraction, without a drop of British blood in my veins. I would like to say it seems very strange to me that a representative of the United States Government should refer to the Palestine problem as "insuperable." I was under the impression that the United States knew all about the Palestine problem, and could solve it easily. It seems to me we were very free with our advice when England was trying to handle the problem alone. If I remember correctly, the President of the United States interfered on several occasions, with pronouncements that greatly embarrassed the British Government and complicated the whole problem. If the British Government seems a little backward about offering advice at this time, it is undoubtedly because they modestly recognize that their advice is no longer needed, now that our own omniscient government is at work on the problem.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur B. Anderson

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Reference:-

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12377

142

1947

PALESTINE

DEC

Registry
Number

E12377/957/31

FROM

C.W.G. Randall

No.

Lorenzen

Dated

416

Received

in Registry

27 Dec

31 -

Last Paper.

12376

References.

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✓ Jan 5

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J.E.M. 11/1

(Index)

J.E.M. 11/1

Next Paper

E 12419

C.N. Palestine Committee Mr. Per Federspiel
 Report Lorenzen reported H13 (E12185/957/31)
 Mr. Per Federspiel, has informed members of Embassy
 staff that he intends to propose to his colleagues
 when they meet in New York that they should go to
 London for discussion and then, in order to meet
 Russian susceptibilities transfer their discussion to
 Moscow. Lorenzen has still entered remark's
 getting involved in Palestine.

(Minutes.)

An odd suggestion, and one which
 I suspect might embarrass the Russians.
 Mr. Federspiel is passing through London in
 the course of the next few days, and may
 perhaps contact us on the C.O.

Copy to
 Northern Dept. 7/1
 FORD (McGillivray)
 J.E.G.
 12/1

H.B. Beeley 11/1

L.F.L. Pyman 2/1

B.A.B. Brown 3.1

Wait and see how this
 develops

J.E.G. Jan 3

with night

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Reference:-

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 12419

31 DEC

144

Registry
Number

E12419/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M'Keel

Dated

20 Dec

Received
in Registry

178

30 Dec

31

U.N. Palestine Commission.

Refer to Reg. No. 170 (E12419/46/9.) Pres reports
 that at latest meeting 29 Dec Bolivian Govt decided
 to accept representation on Commission and to appoint
 Señor Raúl Ríos de Medina, Counsellor of Bolivian
 Embassy at UN to be their representative.

Last Paper.

12377

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

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 D.M.
 Jan.

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completed.)

L. E. W. 11/1
 11/1/48

(Index)

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 11/1/48

Next Paper.

E4/4/31

1948.

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Reference:-

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371/61893

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DIPLMATIC (SECRET)

FROM LA PAZ TO FOREIGN OFFICE

D. 1.10 p.m. 30th December 1947
R. 8.40 p.m. 30th December 1947

30th December 1947
Repeated to Washington

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 178
of 30th December repeated for information to Washington.

Palestine.

My telegram No. 170.

Press reports that a Cabinet meeting held yesterday the Bolivian Government decided to accept representation on the Commission and to appoint Senor Raul Diez de Medina, Counsellor of the Bolivian Embassy at Washington to be their representative.

I have not yet been officially advised.

CCC

E 12419

DIPLMATIC (SECRET)

31 DEC

FROM LA PAZ TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Rees
No. 178

D. 1.10 p.m. 30th December 1947
R. 8.40 p.m. 30th December 1947

30th December 1947
Repeated to Washington

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 178
of 30th December repeated for information to Washington.

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CCC

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Reference:-

371/61893

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM LA PAS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Rees
No. 178

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R. 8.40 p.m. 30th December 1947

30th December 1947
Repeated to Washington

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CCC

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Reference:-

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371/61893